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THE CASE FOR DOING NOTHING ABOUT
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS' COMMON
OWNERSHIP OF SMALL STAKES IN
COMPETING FIRMS
Thomas A. Lambert and Michael E. Sykutat
ABSTRACT
Recent empirical research purports to demonstrate that institutional in-
vestors' "common ownership " of small stakes in competing firms causes
those irms to compete less aggressive y, injuring consumers. A number
of prominent antitrust scholars have cited this research as grounds for
imiting the degree to which institutional investors may hold stakes in
multiple firms that compete in any concentrated market. This Article
contends that the purported competitive problem is overblown and that
the proposed solutions would reduce overall social welfare.
With respect to the puported problem, we show that the theogy of anti-
competitive harm from institutional investors' common ownership is im-
plausible and that the empirical studies supporting the theogy are meth-
odologicalyl unsound. The theogf ails to account for the fact that intra-
industgy diversified institutional investors are also inter-industy diversi-
fied, and it rests upon unrealistic assumptions about managerial deci
szon-making. The empirical studies puporting to demonstrate anticom-
petitive harm rom common ownership are deficient because the inaccu-
ratey assess institutional investors' economic interests and emplqy an
endogenous measure thatprecludes causal inferences.
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debted to Prof. John Howe, University of Missouri Department of Finance, for helpful
insight on this project, and to Brianna S. Hills for exceptional research assistance.
Copyright © 2019 Virginia Law & Business Review Association
214 Virginia Law d_ Business Review 13:2 (2019)
Even if institutional investors' common ownership of competing firms
did soften market competition somewhat, the proposed podiy solutions
would themselves create wel are losses that would overwhelm an social
benefts the secured. The proosed policy solutions would create tremen-
dons new decision costs for business planners and adjudicators and
would raise error costs by eliminating we! are-enhancing investment op
tions and or exacerbating coporate ageny costs.
In 'ght of these problems with the puported problem and shortcomings
of the proposed solutions, the optimal regulatogy approach-at least, on
the current empirical record- is to do nothing about institutional inves
tos' common ownership of small stakes in competingfirms.
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The Case for Doing Nothing
I. INTRODUCTION
N recent months, prominent antitrust scholars have sounded alarm bells
about large institutional investors' "common ownership" of competing
businesses.1 Writing in the Harvard Law Review, Harvard Law School's Einer
Elhauge proclaimed that "[a]n economic blockbuster has recently been ex-
posed"-namely, "[a] small group of institutions has acquired large share-
holdings in horizontal competitors throughout our economy, causing them to
compete less vigorously with each other."' In the Antitrust Law Journal, Eric
Posner of the University of Chicago and Fiona Scott Morton and Glen Weyl
of Yale University contended that "the concentration of markets through
large institutional investors is the major new antitrust challenge of our time." 3
Those same authors took to the pages of the New York Times to argue that
"[t]he great, but mostly unknown, antitrust story of our time is the astonish-
ing rise of the institutional investor ... and the challenge that it poses to mar-
ket competition." 4
Not surprisingly, these scholars have gone beyond just identifying a prob-
lem; they have also advocated policy solutions. Elhauge has called for allow-
ing government enforcers and private parties to use Section 7 of the Clayton
Act,5 the provision primarily used to prevent anticompetitive mergers, to po-
lice institutional investors' ownership of sizable minority positions in compet-
ing firms.6 Posner et al., concerned "that private litigation or unguided public
litigation could cause problems because of the interactive nature of institu-
tional holdings on competition,"7 have proposed that federal antitrust enforc-
ers adopt an enforcement policy that would encourage institutional investors
1 Common ownership occurs when an investor holds significant blocks of the stock of
multiple competitors within an industry. It is not necessary that any block comprise a
controlling share. Indeed, when a stockholder does own a controlling share of at least
one firm within the industry, its holdings of other firms are often referred to as "cross-
ownership" rather than common ownership. This article follows this convention, using
common ownership to refer to holdings of minority (non -controlling) positions in multi-
ple competing firms.
2 Einer Elhauge, HorizontaShareholdng, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2016).
3 Eric A. Posner, Fiona Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to iDmi the Anticompetiive
Power of InstautionalInvestors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 669-70 (2017).
4 Eric Posner, Fiona Scott Morton & Glen Weyl, A Monopoy Donald Trump Can Pop, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/opinion/a-monopoly-
donald-trump-can-pop.html.
5 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
6 Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1302-04.
7 Posner et al., supra note 3, at 678.
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either to avoid common ownership of firms in concentrated industries or to
limit their influence over such firms by refraining from voting their shares.8
Enforcement authorities, it seems, are already on the case. At a March
2016 hearing before a Senate subcommittee, the then head of the Antitrust
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that the DOJ
was investigating potential antitrust issues arising from the common owner-
ship of significant blocks of stock in concentrated industries. 9 In a recent
speech, European Commissioner of Competition Margrethe Vestager an-
nounced that European competition authorities have launched a similar in-
vestigation. 10 The view among many of the antitrust elite thus seems to be (1)
that common ownership by institutional investors such as Vanguard,
BlackRock, and State Street significantly diminish competition in oligopolistic
industries," and (2) that additional antitrust intervention is appropriate to
prevent competitive harm.
We are skeptical of this two-pronged view. With respect to the first part,
we believe there are serious problems with both the theory of competitive
harm stemming from institutional investors' common ownership and the em-
pirical evidence that has been marshalled in support of that theory. With re-
spect to the second, we believe that even if competition were softened by
institutional investors' common ownership of small minority interests in
8 Id. at 708-10; see also Eric Posner & Glen Weyl, The Real Vilain Behind Our New GildedAge,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/opinion/monopoly-
power-new-gilded-age.html ("[Institutional investors] should be allowed to own shares of
no more than one company per industry, or to own no more than a small portion of every
company-say, 1 percent-if they want to remain fully diversified.").
9 Barry A. Nigro, Jr., Cross-Ownership bj Institutional Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 31, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2016/03/31/cross-ownership-by-institutional-investors/#1. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that the major institutional investors are concerned about regulatory interventions to po-
lice common ownership. BlackRock, Inc., the world's largest asset manager, recently dis-
closed in a Securities and Exchange Commission filing that its "business operations, repu-
tation or financial condition" could be adversely affected by proposed policies to address
anticompetitive harms from institutional investors' common ownership. BlackRock, Inc.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K) 26 (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/ data/ 1364742/ 000156459018003744/blk -10k 20171231.htm.
1o See Margrethe Vestager, A Market That Works for Consumers, Speech at
Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht International EU Competition Law Forum, Brussels, Bel-
gium (Mar. 12, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/
vestager/ announcements /market-works-consumers en.
it Asset managers BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisers, sometimes
dubbed the "Big Three," are the three largest institutional investors. As of 2016, they had
assets under management of $3.1 trillion, $2.5 trillion, and $1.9 trillion, respectively. Luci-
an A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott first, The Ageng Problems of Insitutional Investors, 31 J.
ECON. PERSP. 89, 94 (2017).
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competing firms, the unintended negative consequences of an antitrust fix
would outweigh any benefits from such intervention.
The bulk of this Article explains why the purported problem is over-
blown (Part II) and why additional antitrust intervention to fix it is, at least at
current levels of common ownership, unwarranted (Part 111).12 Before we get
to all that, Part I sets the stage by describing the theory as to how institutional
investors' common ownership may reduce competition in concentrated in-
dustries, the empirical evidence purportedly supporting that theory, and the
various policy solutions that have been proposed to prevent the alleged harm
to competition.
II. THE PURPORTED PROBLEM AND PROPOSED POLICY SOLUTIONS
A. The Theory Underlying the Purported Problem
To understand the theory as to how common ownership by institutional
investors could raise prices and reduce market output, it may help to return to
basics. Economists have long understood that monopolists maximize their
profits by reducing output and increasing prices above competitive levels. In a
perfectly competitive market (a market for a commodity like wheat would
come close), each producer is a "price taker," meaning that its output is so
small relative to the overall market output that it cannot affect market price
by altering its level of output. In such a market, each producer maximizes its
profits by producing to the point at which its marginal cost of production-
the incremental cost of producing the last unit of output, a cost that rises as
more units are produced-equals the market price, which is determined en-
tirely by forces independent of the producer itself. In a monopoly, by con-
trast, the producer is a "price maker," meaning that its output decision helps
determine market price (i.e., increases in output lower market price; reduc-
tions raise it). In determining how much to produce, the monopolist equates
its marginal revenue-the additional revenue it gets from producing another
unit, a figure that declines with increased production-with its (rising) mar-
ginal cost of production. Each production increase by the monopolist causes
12 It is important to note here that we are arguing against additional antitrust intervention,
beyond enforcement of well-established antitrust rules. As Douglas Ginsburg and Keith
lovers have observed, rules against hub-and-spoke conspiracies and restrictions on con-
spiracy- facilitating information exchanges could prevent many of the potential anticom-
petitive harms from common ownership. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Keith lovers, Common
Sense About Common Ownership, 2 CONCURRENCES REV. 1, 11 (2018). We are not arguing
against enforcement of such garden variety antitrust doctrines.
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the market price to drop (as reflected in the downward- sloping demand
curve), but marginal revenue falls even further since the monopolist must
charge the lower price resulting from an output increase on all units sold, not
just the additional ones. 13
Figures A and B illustrate the differences in market output and price in
competitive versus monopolized markets. In a competitive market (Figure A),
competing producers continue to produce so that total market output rises to
Qc and price is driven down to Pc. The total welfare in such a market is the
shaded area between the demand curve (which indicates consumers' subjec-
tive valuation of the output produced) and the supply curve (which indicates
the cost of producing that output). That welfare is shared between producers
and consumers: Consumers receive the (dotted) consumer surplus (the differ-
ence between the price they pay, Pc, and their subjective valuation of the out-
put produced); producers receive the (vertically lined) producer surplus (the
difference between the cost of production and the price charged). By con-
trast, in a monopolized market (Figure B), output is artificially reduced from
Qc to QM, causing price to rise from Pc to Pm. This redistributes surplus
from consumers to producers, as is evident from comparing the dotted and
vertically lined areas in Figure B with those in Figure A. In addition, the artifi-
cial output restriction results in a reduction in overall social welfare, illustrated
by the diagonally shaded triangle in Figure B. That "deadweight loss" triangle
represents the social wealth that is squandered when the monopolist fails to
produce output that would create more value to society than it would cost to
produce (i.e., units QM to Qc).
13 Suppose, for example, that if a monopolist were to produce only one unit, consumers
would bid up the price of that unit to $20. If two were produced, the bidding would end
at $18. If three were produced, bidding would top out at $16; four, $14; five, $12; six, $10,
etc. Under these circumstances, market price falls by $2 for each additional unit produced.
The monopolist's marginal revenue, however, falls by $4 per additional unit: Going from
one unit of production to two causes the monopolist's total revenue to rise from $20
(1"$20) to $36 (2"$18), for a marginal revenue gain of $16; going from two to three units
raises total revenue to $48 (3"$16), indicating a marginal revenue gain of $12; increasing
from three to four units increases total revenue to $56 (4"$14), so the marginal revenue
gain is $8; etc.














Even in a nominally competitive market, the unfortunate state of affairs
depicted in Figure B may result if producers coordinate to reduce their aggre-
gate output to the level a single monopolist would produce. Effective coordi-
nation would be difficult to achieve in a highly competitive market with lots
of producers, but it could occur if the market at issue were concentrated. If
there were only four competitors in the market, for example, they could max-
imize their collective profits by each cutting back on production so that total
market output falls from Qc to QM.
Price
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So why don't firms in concentrated industries routinely take this tack?
Granted, an express agreement to cut back production in a coordinated fash-
ion would subject firms to liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,14 but
why not engage in tacit coordination i.e., a "gentlemen's agreement"? As it
turns out, such coordination is quite difficult to accomplish because, while all
firms stand to benefit from coordination, each individual firm stands to gain
the most if its rivals coordinate (thereby pushing prices up) while it competes
(lowering its own price to win business from the coordinating rivals).' 5 That is
the best of all possible worlds for a producer in a concentrated industry.
When one firm ceases to coordinate, however, two things occur. First, each
coordinating firm earns less as the cheating firm's increased output lowers the
market price. Second, the coordinating firms are themselves tempted to cheat
as they observe the initial cheater reaping a windfall while their own profits
shrink. The upshot is that tacit coordination is difficult to sustain; even in
concentrated industries, competition tends to break out.
Now, while a cheater gains when it departs from a coordinated produc-
tion or pricing strategy, the amount it gains is less than the amount its coordi-
nating rivals collectively lose. That is apparent from Figure B. Coordinating
rivals do best by acting, in the aggregate, like a monopolist. If the monopolist
in Figure B were to expand its output beyond QM-the practical effect of
cheating by one of the coordinating firms-the monopolist's profits would
decrease. 16 This implies that departing from coordination within a concentrat-
ed industry-i.e., engaging in price competition to win business-enhances
the competing firm's profits but reduces overall industry profits.
In most cases, shareholders of a corporation want managers to pursue
policies that maximize the company's profits (i.e., "own-firm" profits). For
that reason, shareholders of firms in concentrated industries typically prefer
business-usurping price and quality competition even if it reduces industry
profits by disrupting producers' attempted coordination. Things look differ-
14 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (prohibiting contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unreason-
ably restrain trade).
15 As Elhauge explains:
In competitive markets where ownership is separate, economic models prove
that firms have incentives to undercut each others' prices because the profits
they gain from the additional sales exceed the price reduction caused by their
own conduct. Because each firm sets prices based on the same calculus, they
keep undercutting each other until they drive down prices toward marginal cost,
which is the most efficient level.
Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1269.
16 Because increased production lowers market price, production of units beyond QM results
in marginal costs that exceed marginal revenues.
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ent, though, to investors who are fully "intra-industry diversified"-i.e., those
holding similarly sized percentages of all the firms within an industry. Those
investors would prefer that managers maximize industry profits by avoiding
price competition. For example, whereas a shareholder owning 1% of South-
west Airlines would want for it to compete vigorously to win business from
Delta, United, and American Airlines, a shareholder owning 1% of each of
those airlines would prefer that none of them try to win business from the
others by lowering price from monopoly levels. After all, any gain in market
share for one company will come at the expense of the others, and the aver-
age price (and profit margin) on units sold will fall.
It is likely, then, that if a single investor owned a controlling share in all
the firms in an industry, price and quality competition would soften. But how
could common ownership of sma!!percentages of firms (say, one to ten percent)
reduce competition? Wouldn't firm managers defer to the interests of the
bulk of their shareholders, who are not intra-industry diversified? Those
shareholders would prefer that the managers maximize own-firm rather than
industry profits.
Proponents of restrictions on common ownership by institutional inves-
tors have offered two responses to these questions. First, they have observed
that in many concentrated industries, the leading firms have several top
shareholders that are intra-industry diversified. While each such shareholder
may own only a small percentage of each company's stock, the total percent-
age held by intra-industry diversified shareholders as a group may be substan-
tial. For example, Elhauge observes that "from 2013 to 2015, seven share-
holders who controlled 60.0% of United Airlines also controlled big chunks
of United's major rivals, including 27.5% of Delta Airlines, 27.3% of JetBlue
Airlines, and 23.3% of Southwest Airlines."' i The implication is that manag-
ers of these firms would perceive that shareholders owning roughly a quarter
of their companies' shares would prefer maximization of industry, rather than
own-firm, profits.
Moreover, proponents of common ownership restrictions observe that
institutional investors have outsized power relative to their ownership stakes.
Compared to individual shareholders, who tend to be poorly positioned to
monitor management and whose stakes in corporate profits are generally too
small to warrant extensive efforts to steer corporate affairs, 18 institutional in-
1 Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1267.
18 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Coporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1443 (1989) ("Investors are rationally uninterested in votes, not only because no in-
vestor's vote will change the outcome of the election but also because the information
necessary to cast an informed vote is not readily available.").
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vestors are much better able to influence management decision-making. They
tend to possess more extensive monitoring resources and greater expertise on
matters of business strategy and firm policy. They also hold larger stakes (and
correlative voting power) in the corporations in which they are invested, and
they therefore have greater incentives to become informed before voting.19 In
addition, their votes often attract media attention that amplifies their power
over management. Given their greater clout, institutional investors are in a
better position to engage corporate managers, and anecdotal evidence sug-
gests they regularly do so. 20 For all these reasons, common ownership critics
assert, corporate managers often honor the preferences of institutional inves-
tors over those of individual stockholders, even when the latter group collec-
tively owns a greater proportion of company stock.21
Putting all this together generates the two main premises of the theoreti-
cal argument that common ownership by institutional investors softens com-
19 Posner et al. emphasize these differences between individual and institutional investors:
The separation of ownership and control that makes possible very large com-
panies leads to managers who are not supervised by a knowledgeable monitor,
but only by very small individual shareholders who do not have the time, in-
formation, or power to oversee management. Institutional investors by con-
trast, could potentially improve on this Berle-Means model of the corpora-
tion featuring widely dispersed ownership by shareholders with tiny stakes-
by supplying informed and incentivized oversight.
Posner et al., supra note 3, at 674.
20 For example, Posner et al. point to Vanguard's recent announcement that it had, over the
past year, "conducted over 800 engagements with the management or directors at compa-
nies of different types and sizes, encompassing nearly $1 trillion in Vanguard fund assets."
Id. at 675 (quoting VANGUARD, Our Engagement Efforts and Prox Voting. An Update,
https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/8-Proxy-voting-and-
engagement-efforts--An-update -Vanguard.pdfl. The announcement continued:
Our engagement volume represents an increase of 19% over the previous 12-
month period and 67% over the past three years. Though we engage with com-
panies for a variety of reasons, we are most likely to engage because we are pre-
paring to vote at the shareholder meeting, an event has occurred at the compa-
ny that could affect stock value, or our research has uncovered a specific gov-
ernance concern that is not on the ballot.
Id.; see also Matthew J. Mallow &Jasmin Sethi, Egagemen. The Missing Middle Approach in the
Bebchuk-Stine Debate, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 385, 394-96 (2016) (providing examples of
engagement by institutional investors).
21 According to Posner et al., this conclusion:
follows from a very simple logic: someone must determine the firms' goals.
That controller is likely to be one of the largest shareholders. If there are no
large concentrated shareholders, then the firm will likely be run in the interests
of its institutional investors even if these do not individually own very large
stakes.
Posner et al., supra note 3, at 684-85.
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petition in concentrated industries. The first premise is that intra-industry
diversified institutional investors have an interest in maximizing industry prof-
its and would prefer that corporate managers not engage in business -usurping
competition that would enhance own-firm profits but reduce producer sur-
plus within the industry. The second is that institutional investors, possessing
better monitoring resources and business expertise, a greater interest in man-
agerial decision-making, and an enhanced ability to attract media attention
with their votes, have sufficient influence over corporate managers to induce
them to refrain from own-firm profit maximization in favor of industry profit
maximization.
Later on (in Subsection ILA) we will question each of these premises.
First, though, we turn to consider (1) the empirical evidence that has been
cited in support of the view that common ownership by institutional investors
reduces price competition and (2) the policy proposals such evidence has
provoked.
B. The Empirical Evidence
Two recent studies-one involving the U.S. airline industry,22 the other
involving commercial banks2 3-purport to demonstrate that institutional in-
vestors' common ownership of competing firms has substantially reduced
competition and injured consumers in concentrated industries. A third study
has suggested that growth in institutional investors' common ownership has
increased the incidence of executive compensation policies that encourage
firm managers to pursue industry, rather than own-firm, profits.2 4
In Antcompetitive Effects of Common Ownership (the airline study), co-authors
Jos6 Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, and Isabel Tecu tested whether institutional
investors' common ownership of interests in domestic airlines raised airfares
higher than they otherwise would be. To assess common ownership and the
degree to which it changed over time, the authors used a measurement known
as the MHHI delta (MIHIA).25 The MIHIA is a component of the "modi-
fied Herfindahl-Hirschman Index" (MHI), which, as the name suggests, is
22 Josd Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Aniompefiive Effects of Common Ownership, 73
J. FIN. 1513 (2018).
23 Josd Azar, Sahil Raina & Martin Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition
(July 23, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cffm?
abstract id=2710252.
24 Miguel Ant6n et al., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Mana gement Inceniives (Ross Sch.
of Bus., Paper No. 1328, 2017), https://papers.ssM.com/sol3/papers.cffmabstract
id=2802332.
25 Azar et al., supra note 22, at 1522.
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an adaptation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a well-known
measure used in evaluating the legality of business mergers. The HHI, which
is calculated by summing the squares of the market shares of the firms partic-
ipating in a market, assesses the degree to which a market is concentrated and
thus susceptible to collusion or oligopolistic coordination. 26 The MHHI seeks
to account for both market concentration (HHI) and the reduced competition
incentives occasioned by common ownership of the firms within a market
(i.e., the degree to which common ownership is likely to induce firm manag-
ers to pull their competitive punches).2' The MLHIA is the part of MLHI
that accounts for common ownership incentives, so MIHI = HHI +
MHHIA.
Calculating the MHHIA for a particular market is a bit complicated, and
we defer detailed discussion of the measure's formula to an appendix. 28 For
present purposes, it will suffice to understand what the MLHIA purports to
measure and which variables determine its magnitude. MHHIA endeavors to
assess the degree to which the managers of firms within an industry, on the
assumption that they seek to maximize their shareholders' returns, would
cause their firms to eschew vigorous competition in favor of oligopolistic co-
ordination in an effort to maximize industry (rather than own-firm) profits.
The primary variables that determine MIHIA are 29:
* the degree of control intra-industry diversified investors exercise
over the managers of their portfolio firms (the greater such con-
trol, the higher the MHMI);
* the size of the financial stakes intra-industry diversified investors
hold in the firms within the industry, and the degree to which,
for each such investor, those stakes are equal across firms (the
greater the stakes of intra-industry diversified shareholders and
the more equal those stakes across firms, so that the investors
have a greater interest in industry than own-firm profits, the
higher the MHHIA);
* the degree to which the firms within the industry have non-
diversified shareholders with control over firm management (the
26 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 5.3, at 18-19 (2010) (describing HHI).
27 Azar et al., supra note 22, at 1519, 1522.
28 In addition to this article's Appendix A, which offers a non-technical explanation of the
MHHIA, interested readers may wish to consult the descriptions of the metric provided
by Posner et al. and O'Brien and Waehrer. See Daniel P. O'Brien & Keith Waehrer, The
Compeitive Effects of Common Ownership: We Know Less Than We Think, 81 ANTITRUST L.J.
729, 742-43 (2017); Posner et al., supra note 3, at 682-84.
29 Posner et al., supra note 3, at 683 (setting forth formula for MHHIA).
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greater the financial stakes and control of investors who are not
intra-industry diversified, the lower the MLHIA); and
* the market shares of firms that share common ownership by in-
vestors (the greater the market shares, the greater the market ef-
fect of management's decisions concerning competitive behavior,
and the higher the MIHIA).
Appendix A to this article sets forth, in non-technical terms, the intuition
underlying the MLHIA and the steps involved in calculating the metric for a
particular market.
In the airline paper, Azar et al. first calculated the MH IA on each do-
mestic airline route from 2001 to 2014.30 The authors then examined, for each
route, how changes in the MIHIA over time correlated with changes in air-
fares on that route. This approach offered two significant advantages.31 First,
it accounted for determinants of price that were route- or carrier- specific but
did not vary over time. If, for example, gate fees were higher on some routes
than others, but were constant over time, those differences would not affect
the correlation between route-level changes in price and changes in MIHIA;
the higher gate fees would be incorporated in prices both before and after any
changes in MHHIA. Second, the approach accounted for industry-wide price-
affecting events occurring within the time period studied (and thus causing
prices to change over time). For example, if fuel prices shot up during the
period studied, one would expect the prices charged by all carriers to rise by
roughly the same percentage, and it would be possible to see whether fare
changes were greater or less on routes experiencing a change in MIHIA.
To supplement the aforementioned advantages, the authors ran regres-
sions to control for route-specific, time-varying factors that might influence
both fares and the MHHIA. For example, they controlled for market concen-
tration (the traditional HHI), the number of non-stop carriers on a route, the
presence of low-cost carriers, the share of connecting passengers, and market
demographics.32 Controlling for all these factors, they concluded that com-
30 Azar et al., supra note 22, at 1526-28. In response to commentators' concerns, the authors
later repeated their analysis using city pairs instead of specific air routes-e.g., Chicago to
New York instead of Chicago O'Hare to New York LaGuardia. See Einer Elhauge, The
Growing Problem of Horizontal Shareholding, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L ANTITRUST CHRON.,
Spring 2017, at 1, 6 (observing that "a revision of the airline study shows that using city
pairs actually makes the harmful price effects larred') (emphasis in original).
31 See Josd Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Whj Common Ownership Creates Antitrust
Risks, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L ANTITRUST CHRON., Spring 2017, at 1, 5 (discussing the
two methodological advantages described in the text following this note).
32 Azar et al., supra note 22, at 1529.
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mon ownership of air carriers resulted in fares being 3 to 7 percent higher
than they otherwise would be. 33
The authors understood that the correlations they discovered might not
prove that changes in MIHIA caused higher fares; the causal relationship
could operate in the opposite direction. For example, it could be that institu-
tional investors correctly predict the routes on which demand will be greater
(and prices and profit margins, higher) and invest in the airlines that dispro-
portionately fly those routes. (That would drive up MHHIA.) Or it could be
that there are some other factors, not controlled for in the regressions, that
influence both airfares and MHHIA.
To address these reverse causation and endogeneity concerns, the authors
conducted additional analyses. For one thing, they examined the correlation
between MIHIA and passenger volume.3 4 They reasoned that if increased
passenger demand, leading to higher prices and profits, were attracting in-
vestment by institutional investors (i.e., if higher prices caused increased
MHHIA rather than vice-versa), changes in MHHIA would be correlated with
increased passenger volume.35 In fact, the authors found the opposite; an in-
crease in MIHIA was negatively correlated with passenger volume.36
The authors also examined BlackRock's 2009 acquisition of Barclay's
Global Investors.3 That acquisition, which was certainly not driven by expec-
tations about route-level airtare increases, did have the effect of increasing
MHHIA.38 The fact that airtares rose on the relevant routes following the
merger, the authors reasoned, supported the conclusion that MLHIA changes
were influencing fares.3 9
In Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition (the banking study), which has
provoked less commentary than the airline study, Azar, Sahil Raina, and
Schmalz attempted to assess how common ownership has affected service
fees and interest rates in local markets for bank deposits.4 0 The authors corre-
33 Id. at 1559. An instrumental variable analysis by the authors found even greater adverse
effects. It suggested that common ownership increased airfares between 10 and 12 per-
cent. Id.
34 Id. at 1541-44.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1535-41.
38 Id. at 1538, 1541.
39 Id. at 1541; see also Azar et al., supra note 31, at 5 C'This acquisition is a helpful 'experi-
ment' because the changes in route-level ownership structures implied by the merger were
arguably not caused by expected route-level changes in U.S. airfares. Any measured effect
must therefore work from increased common ownership to higher fares, rather than the
other way around.").
40 Azar et al., supra note 23, at 1-3.
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lated account fees, the minimum account sizes required to avoid fees (fee
thresholds), and interest rates paid on deposits with the "generalized HHI"
(GHHI), a metric similar to M1HI. 4 1 They concluded that for interest-
bearing checking accounts, a one standard deviation increase in GHHI in-
creased fees by about 11 percent and fee thresholds by around 17 percent. 42
For money market accounts, a similar increase in GHiI resulted in a 3 per-
cent increase in fees and a 17 percent increase in fee thresholds. 43 They also
found that increases in GHHI reduced the interest rates paid to depositors. 44
A third recent study did not look directly at consumer prices (or price-
related terms such as interest rates on deposits) but instead considered
whether common ownership leads to managerial compensation mechanisms
that could encourage the pursuit of industry, rather than own-firm, profits. In
Common Ownersht, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (the executive
compensation study), co-authors Miguel Ant6n, Florian Ederer, Mireia Gin6,
and Martin Schmalz found that the higher the MIHIA is, the greater the pos-
itive sensitivity between managerial compensation and industry profits relative
to the positive sensitivity between compensation and own-firm profits. 45
C. Proposed Policy Solutions
Legal scholars have proposed policies for reducing the sort of anticom-
petitive threat the aforementioned studies purport to have revealed. Elhauge
has advocated using Section 7 of the Clayton Act to arrest anticompetitive
harms from horizontal shareholding. 46 Although Section 7 is typically used to
police business mergers posing anticompetitive threats, its sweeping language
41 Id. at 22-24. The formula for the MHHJ, which works when there is either common
ownership of competing firms by third-parties or cross-ownership of some firms by oth-
ers, must be refined if either (1) there is a mixture of common- and cross-ownership, or
(2) the cross-ownership involves both cross-owned firms holding stakes in each other
(e.g., firm A owns a stake in firm B and firm B owns a stake in A). The GHHJ incorpo-
rates the necessary refinement. See Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1277 n.48.
42 Azar et al., supra note 23, at 24.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 23.
45 Anton et al., supra note 24, at 3. Notably, another recent paper reached the opposite con-
clusion, finding that common ownership increases the extent to which managers are re-
warded for actions that increase own-firm profits relative to industry profits. See Heung
jin Kwon, Executive Compensation Under Common Ownership 2 (Nov. 29, 2016)
(working paper) (on file with University of Chicago Department of Economics),
http://fmaconferences.org/Boston/ExecutiveCompens ationunderCommonOwnership.p
df. A potential explanation for that finding is that common ownership sensitizes corpo-
rate executives to their performance relative to rivals. Id. at 34.
46 Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1302-04.
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appears broad enough to reach competition-reducing horizontal shareholding
by third-party investors. 47 It provides:
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any part of the stock ... of one or more persons engaged in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in
any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition..
or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of
proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion .... 48
Although Section 7 does include a "passive investor" exception, 49 El-
hauge contends that it would not preclude liability for institutional investors'
horizontal shareholding. He says that the exception applies if two require-
ments are met: "(1) the stock acquisition must be soley for investment; and (2)
the acquired stock must not actual/y be used to lessen competition substantial-
ly or to attempt to do so."50 The first requirement is unlikely to be met in the
case of horizontal shareholdings by institutional investors, Elhauge says, be-
cause it has been interpreted to exclude investments "that give the stock ac-
quirer any influence over the corporation's business decisions (including by
voting) or any access to the corporation's sensitive business information."5'
He adds that the element has been found to be met "only when the investor
committed either to not vote its stock or ... to vote the shares in the same
proportion as other shareholders vote, often with the additional requirements
that the investor not nominate directors, have any representative on the
47 Id.
48 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
49 By its terms, Section 's prohibition does not reach "persons purchasing such stock solely
for investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in at-
tempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition." Id.
50 Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1305. Douglas Ginsburg and Keith Mlovers have taken issue with
Elhauge's characterization of the second requirement of Section 's passive investor ex-
ception. Carefully parsing the caselaw upon which Elhauge relies, they contend that "it is
the acquirer's intention that matters, not, as Elhauge would have it, whether 'the acquired
stock is actually used, bj votng or otherise, to lessen competion substantia/9."' Ginsburg &
Mlovers, supra note 12, at 9 (quoting Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1307-08). Ginsburg and
Mlovers further observe that all the cases upon which Elhauge relies involve cross-
ownership, not common ownership, Ginsburg & Mlovers, supra note 12, at 8, that the
most direct judicial pronouncement in support of his view was an obiter &ctum, id. at 9, and
that he is ultimately left to rely on the sort of purely textualist analysis that is often inap-
propriate in interpreting the antitrust laws, id. at 7.
51 Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1305-06.
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board, or exert any other form of influence over management."5 2 The excep-
tion's second requirement would not be satisfied, Elhauge maintains, if the
horizontal shareholding, even if purely passive, lessened the incentives of the
firms to compete with each other.5 3 Price effects such as those purportedly
revealed by the airline study would thus prevent the exception from applying.
Based on the empirical evidence discussed above, Elhauge concludes
(somewhat curiously) that the case for liability would be strong whenever a
stock purchase by an intra-industry diversified institutional investor resulted
in an MIHIA of greater than 200 in a market with an MHI exceeding
2500.54 In fact, he says it should be easier to assign liability on the basis of a
third-party investment involving this magnitude of MHHIA than on the basis
of a merger that altered the HHI by a similar degree; whereas mergers often
generate integrative efficiencies that may offset potential anticompetitive ef-
fects from increased concentration, third-party stock acquisitions rarely ena-
ble cognizable offsetting efficiencies.55 While horizontal shareholding by in-
52 Id. at 1306. Ginsburg and IKlovers dispute Elhauge's construal of the cases cited in sup-
port of this proposition. See Ginsburg & Mlovers, supra note 12, at 8-9 (criticizing El-
hauge's interpretation of United States v. Tracinda Investment Coo., 477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), and Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
53 Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1308. But see Ginsburg & Movers, supra note 12, at 8-10 (observ-
ing that "it is the acquirer's intention that matters").
54 Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1303. We say that Elhauge's suggested thresholds for potential
antitrust liability are curious because they appear to be oblivious to the range of potential
MHHI and MHHIA values. Elhauge relies on the federal antitrust enforcement agencies'
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which deem a market with an HHI greater than 2500 to be
highly concentrated and state that mergers increasing HHI by over 200 in such markets
"will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power." See Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines, supra note 26, at § 5.3. The Merger Guidelines' HHI thresholds make some sense,
given that 2500 is the HHI that would result from a duopoly in which two firms split the
market equally, and an HHI increase of 200 represents 2% of the maximum value HHI
can obtain (10,000). MHHI and MHHIA, however, are not subject to the same maximum
value as HH. For example, if there are four firms in a market, five institutional investors
that each own 5% of the first three firms and 1% of the fourth, and no other investors
holding significant stakes in any of the firms, MHHIA will be 15,500 and MHHI 18,000.
Indeed, in this four-firm market with five institutional investors and no other significant
shareholders, MHHIA could reach astronomical proportions-up to 26,864,516,491 (with
an HHI of only 2717)-even if no institutional investor held more than 5% of any firm's
stock. (We derived this figure using Excel's solver tool to maximize MHHIA, subject to
the constraints of four firms with market shares totaling 100%, five significant investors,
and no investment stake greater than 5%). There appears to be no theoretical, mathemat-
ical, or experiential basis for suggesting that a 200-point change in MHHIA has any com-
petitive significance against a potential value of almost 27 billion.
55 Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1303 ("A true merger creates integrative efficiencies that might
offset any anticompetitive effect from increasing concentration. In contrast, stock acquisi-
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dex funds may create portfolio diversification benefits for fund investors, El-
hauge says those benefits could largely be achieved by inter-industry diversifi-
cation (e.g., owning stock in many industries, but of only one firm per indus-
try) so little investor benefit is derived from intra-industry common share-
holding.56 Moreover, he observes, judicial precedents and enforcement guide-
lines from the antitrust agencies typically do not allow efficiencies outside the
market in which an acquisition is occurring to offset the anticompetitive risks
occasioned by the acquisition.5 (This reluctance to credit extra-market effi-
ciencies stems from Section 7 's language prohibiting stock acquisitions that
may substantially lessen competition "in any line of commerce."58 )
Elhauge envisions both public and private lawsuits as a means of deter-
ring anticompetitive horizontal shareholding. He encourages DOJ and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to "investigate any horizontal stock acqui-
sitions that have created, or would create, [an MHHIA] of over 200 in a mar-
ket with an MHHI over 2500, in order to determine whether those horizontal
stock acquisitions raised prices or are likely to do so."5 9 In addition, states
could sue on behalf of their residents who are injured by horizontal share-
holdings.60 The enforcement mechanism most likely to induce changes on the
part of institutional investors, however, would be private class actions seeking
treble damages for overcharges resulting from reduced competition.6 1 For
example, "A class of passengers injured by paying higher airline fares because
of horizontal shareholdings on a concentrated route could . . .bring suit on
the theory that the stock acquisitions by institutional investors that created
those horizontal shareholdings harmed the passengers by lessening airline
competition. "62
In light of the crippling liability that could result from private actions for
treble damages, institutional investors would likely change their business prac-
tices. Elhauge suggests two ways they might minimize the risk of antitrust
tions that create horizontal shareholdings generate no such offsetting integrative efficien-
cies.").
56 Id. ("Virtually all diversification benefits could be achieved by investing in one corpora-
tion in each market.").
57 Id. at 1304 (observing that "efficiency benefits in one market cannot offset anticompeti-
tive effects in another market").
58 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
59 Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1303.
60 Id. at 1304 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 15C).
61 Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes private treble damages actions by persons injured
in their business or property by antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2018).
62 Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1304.
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liability from investments in concentrated markets. 63 First, they could refrain
from horizontal shareholding, limiting their investments to only one of the
competing firms in a concentrated market.64 Second, they could refrain from
voting their stock (or, similarly, vote their shares in proportion to how the
other shareholders vote).65
Posner et al. agree with Elhauge that the anticompetitive potential from
current levels of horizontal shareholding is sufficient to warrant a governmen-
tal fix.66 They are not in favor, however, of relying on haphazard antitrust
suits to address the problem. They are "concerned that, absent clear guide-
lines for when such cases would or would not be brought, such litigation
could lead to a combination of chaos and stasis." 6 7 Chaos would result from
different jurisdictions adopting different liability rules; stasis, from courts at-
tempting to avoid industry disruption by adopting broad exemptions that
would allow status quo harms to continue.68 To avoid those outcomes, Pos-
ner et al. propose a more rule-based approach, where the specifics of what is
allowed and disallowed are set forth ex ante.69
Under their proposed rule, any investor holding more than 1% of the ag-
gregate equity in an industry deemed oligopolistic by the FTC and DOJ
would be allowed to hold stock in only one firm within that industry.70 Inves-
tors holding less than 1% of total industry equity could own shares in multiple
industry participants, as could free-standing index funds that committed to
pure passivity within the industry.7' To be "purely passive," the index fund
would have to abstain from communicating with management, to vote its
shares in proportion to other shareholders' votes (negating any voting influ-
ence on the part of the investor), and to trade stocks only in accordance with
pre-announced, non-discretionary rules (such as following a particular index
as closely as possible).72
Posner et al. observe that their proposed rule could be adopted multiple
ways: as an enforcement policy of the FTC and DOJ, as a regulation promul-
63 Id. at 1314.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1314-15.
66 Posner et al., supra note 3, at 691.
67 Id. at 691-92.
68 Id. at 692-94.
69 See id. at 708-09.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 709.
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gated under Section 5 of the FTC Act, or as a statute enacted by Congress.73
In light of the practical difficulties of moving legislation through Congress
and the notice-and-comment requirements (and inevitable judicial review)
involved in a regulatory approach, they suggest that the agencies adopt their
rule as an enforcement guideline.74
Having set the stage by describing the theory as to how common owner-
ship by institutional investors could reduce competition, the empirical evi-
dence that it has done so, and the leading proposals for addressing that prob-
lem, we turn to analysis. In Part II, we consider whether institutional inves-
tors' common ownership of small stakes in competing firms really poses a
significant competitive problem. In Part III, we ask whether the proposed
solutions to that problem (assuming it exists) are likely to enhance overall
social welfare.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE PROBLEM
Proponents of restrictions on common ownership by institutional inves-
tors have articulated a theory as to how intra-industry diversification may re-
duce market competition, and they point to empirical evidence purporting to
confirm that theory. There are, however, significant problems with both the
73 Id. at 709. Section 5 authorizes the FTC to promulgate rules preventing "unfair methods
of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2018).
74 Id. at 709. In addition to this antitrust-based solution, two of the co-authors of the Posner
et al. proposal, Eric Posner and Glen Weyl, advocate a tax solution to the purported prob-
lem of common ownership by institutional investors. They propose that Congress enact
legislation removing the tax advantages available to employer-sponsored retirement plans
unless those plans "offer only mutual funds that do not own a significant number of
shares of more than one firm in a specific industry." Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Mutual
Funds' Dark Side, SLATE (Apr. 16, 2015, 9:46 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2015/04/mutual- fmds -make-air-travel-more-expensive-institutional-investors-
reduce-competition.html. They say that such an approach, under which "mutual funds
would be allowed to own shares of only a single firm in any specific industry, but could
invest in as many industries as they wanted," would allow for the sort of inter-industry di-
versification that protects investors, while avoiding the intra-industry diversification that
may soften competition. Id. ("By owning shares in different industries, mutual funds could
continue to offer the diversification benefits that investors value them for. But because
mutual funds would not be allowed to own shares of firms in the same industry, they
would have no incentive to encourage firms not to compete on price.") Notably, Posner
and Weyl would not limit their proposed denial of tax benefits to mutual funds that are
intra-industry diversified in o/{gopo/stic industries. Even in competitive industries, tax-
advantaged mutual funds would be required to avoid intra-industry diversification.
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theory of anticompetitive harm and the empirical evidence purportedly sup-
porting it.
A. Problems with the Theory
The theoretical argument for the claim that intra-industry diversification
by institutional investors softens market competition proceeds as follows:
Premise 1 Because institutional investors are intra-industry
diversified, they benefit if their portfolio firms in concentrat-
ed industries seek to maximize industry, rather than own-
firm, profits.
Premise 2: Corporate managers seek to maximize the re-
turns of their corporations' largest shareholders-intra-
industry diversified institutional investors-and will thus
pursue maximization of industry profits.
Premise 3. Industry profits, unlike own-firm profits, are
maximized when producers refrain from underpricing their
rivals to win business.
Therefore,
Conclusion: Intra-industry diversification by institutional
investors reduces price competition and should be restricted.
While the third premise of this argument is sound, the first two premises are
questionable at best.
With respect to Premise 1, it is by no means clear that intra-industry di-
versified institutional investors benefit from, and thus prefer, maximization of
industry rather than own-firm profits. For one thing, maximization of indus-
try profits confers no competitive advantage on an institutional investor's
largest index funds, which are the funds of greatest concern to those who
would restrict intra-industry diversification. If maximizing industry profits by
refraining from price competition enhances the returns of a Vanguard fund
that is based on a well-known stock index (e.g., the S&P 500), it will similarly
enhance the returns of a State Street, BlackRock, or Fidelity fund that tracks
the same index.75 Accordingly, competition among passively managed index
funds is not based on fund returns but instead occurs along two dimensions:
tracking (the extent to which the portfolio accurately reflects the index at is-
sue) and management fees. 76 Given that the returns of portfolio companies
75 See Bebchuk, et al., supra note 11, at 98.
76 See, e.g., Shauna Carther Heyford, The Hidden Differences Between Index Funds, INVESTOPEDIA
(June 30, 2012), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/03/061103.asp (re-
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matter little in the competition for index fund investors' dollars, managers of
index funds should care little whether their portfolio companies pursue own-
firm or industry profits.
Even when fund returns are significant in attracting retail investors to one
institutional investor's offerings over another's, as is the case with institutional
investors' actively managed mutual funds, it is unlikely that fund sponsors
would prefer maximization of industry versus own-firm profits in the indus-
tries in which they are fully diversified. That is because intra-industry diversi-
fied mutual funds tend also to be inter-industry diversified, and maximizing
one industry's profits requires supracompetitive pricing that tends to reduce
the profits of firms in complementary industries. A leading Vanguard fund,
for example, holds around 2% of each major airline (1.85% of United, 2.07%
of American, 2.15% of Southwest, and 1.99% of Delta) but also holds:
* 1.88% of Expedia Inc. (a major retailer of airline tickets),
* 2.20% of Boeing Co. (a manufacturer of commercial jets),
* 2.02% of United Technologies Corp. (a jet engine producer),
* 3.14% of AAR Corp. (the largest domestic provider of commer-
cial aircraft maintenance and repair),
* 1.43% of Hertz Global Holdings Inc. (a major automobile rental
company), and
* 2.17% of Accenture (a consulting firm for which air travel is a
significant cost component).77
Each of those companies-and many others-perform worse when air-
lines engage in the sort of supracompetitive pricing (and corresponding re-
duction in output) that maximizes profits in the airline industry.
Whether a fund will experience a net benefit from reduced price competi-
tion in the industries in which it is intra-industry diversified ultimately de-
pends, of course, on the composition of its particular portfolio. For widely
diversified funds, however, it is unlikely that fund returns will be maximized
by rampant competition-softening. As Figure B depicts, every instance of su-
pracompetitive pricing entails a deadweight loss-i.e., an allocative inefficien-
cy stemming from the failure to produce units that create greater value than
they cost to produce.78 To the extent a mutual fund is designed to reflect
tail investor-focused publication identifying management fees and tracking error as the
key distinctions between funds tracking the same index).
77 Vanguard Index Funds, Quarterly Schedule of Portfolio Holdings of Registered Management
Company (Form N-Q) (May 31, 2017) [hereinafter Vanguard Form N-Q] (holdings per-
centages calculated based on total shares outstanding as of date of Form N-Q filing).
78 This allocative inefficiency is represented by the diagonally shaded triangle in Figure B,
supra Part I.A.
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gains in the economy generally, it will perform best if such allocative ineffi-
ciencies are minimized. It seems, then, that Premise 1-the claim that intra-
industry diversified institutional investors prefer competition -softening so as
to maximize industry profits-is dubious.
Premise 2-the claim that corporate managers will pursue industry rather
than own-firm profits when their largest shareholders prefer that outcome-
is even less plausible. For nearly all companies in which intra-industry diversi-
fied institutional investors collectively hold a significant proportion of out-
standing shares, a majority of the stock is still held by shareholders who are
not fully intra-industry diversified. Those shareholders would prefer that the
company try to win business from its rivals. Proponents of the theory that
institutional investors' common ownership softens competition maintain that
corporate managers disregard the interests of those shareholders in favor of
institutional investors, whose stock ownership is more concentrated.79 The
underlying reasoning seems to be that non-intra-industry diversified share-
holders, despite their greater aggregate voting power, exercise little influence
over management because (1) they are rationally ignorant of management's
decisions (given that each individual shareholder's interest is too small to war-
rant costly monitoring efforts), and (2) they cannot easily coordinate their
widely dispersed voting power. Institutional investors, by contrast, have an
incentive to invest in managerial monitoring, the resources and sophistication
needed to monitor effectively, and command over a great many shares (so
that voting coordination is not necessary to wield influence over manage-
ment). Even if these things are true,8 however, it is doubtful that corporate
managers would routinely disregard the interests of shareholders owning the
79 As Posner et al. put it, "[S]omeone must determine the firm's goals. That controller is
likely to be one of the largest shareholders. If there are no large concentrated sharehold-
ers, then the firm will likely be run in the interests of its institutional investors even if
these do not individually own very large stakes." Posner et al., supra note 3, at 684-85.
80 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst have argued that it is implausible that the
managers of index funds would use their funds' voting power to induce an anticompeti-
tive strategy of industry profit-maximization. See Bebchuk, et al., supra note 11, at 108-09
("Our analysis indicates that index fund managers might well have different incentives
[than to maximize the collective wealth of their beneficial investors], which would lead
them to limit intervention with their portfolio companies. Thus, our analysis suggests that
it is implausible to expect that index fund managers would seek to facilitate significant an-
ticompetitive behavior."). They observe that the relationship between a fund's managers
and investors is subject to agency costs and that managers often underinvest m govern-
ance efforts on behalf of their funds' investors, especially when (as with index funds) the
corporate management decisions that would benefit fund investors would not confer a
competitive advantage on the individual fund. Id. at 97-98.
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bulk of the company's stock and pursue industry rather than own-firm prof-
its.
There are several reasons for this doubt. For one thing, favoring intra-
industry diversified investors holding a minority interest could subject manag-
ers to legal liability. The fiduciary duties of corporate managers require that
they attempt to maximize firm profits for the benefit of shareholders as a
whole; favoring even a controlling shareholder (much less a minority share-
holder) at the expense of other shareholders can result in liability.8' More im-
portantly, managers' personal interests usually align with those of the majority
when it comes to the question of whether to maximize own-firm or industry
profits. As sellers in the market for managerial talent, corporate managers
benefit from reputations for business success, and they can best establish
such reputations by beating (usurping business from) their industry rivals. In
addition, many corporate managers are compensated in stock of the compa-
nies they manage.82 They maximize the value of that stock by maximizing
own-firm, not industry, profits. 83 It thus seems unlikely that corporate manag-
81 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (holding that board action
benefiting controlling shareholder over minority shareholders is subject to demanding in-
trinsic fairness test).
82 See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Execuuve Paj 11 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11443, 2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w11443.pdf (reporting "equity-based compensation as a percentage of total compensa-
tion" for executives of firms included in S&P 500, Mid-Cap 400, and Small-Cap 600 indi-
ces).
83 Proponents of restrictions on intra-industry diversification point to evidence that com-
mon ownership is positively correlated with executive compensation packages that tie pay
to absolute performance rather than to performance relative to industry rivals. See, e.g., El-
hauge, supra note 30, at 3 (citing Ant6n et al., supra note 24). Such evidence, they say,
shows that intra-industry diversification encourages maximization of industry rather than
own-firm profits. The empirical evidence on this matter, however, is mixed, see supra note
45 and accompanying text, and the largest institutional investors support compensating
managers for performance relative to industry rivals. See Our Governance and Executave Com-
pensation Pancp/es, VANGUARD, https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/09/4-Our-govemance-and-executive-compensation-principles- -Vanguard.pdf
("[]ncentives should be structured to reward relative outperformance, as opposed to a
general rise in stock prices or other market-wide trends, over the course of a business or
product cycle that is relevant to the company."); Prox Vo'ng Guidemesfor U.S. Securides,
BLACKROCK 11 (Feb. 2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-
sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf ("Our evaluation of equity compensa-
tion plans is based on a company's executive pay and performance relative to peers and
whether the plan plays a significant role in a pay-for-performance disconnect."); Fidezn
Funds' Prox Voting Guideknes, FIDELITY Jan. 2018), https://www.fidelity.com/bm-
public/060 www fidelity com/ documents/ Full-Proxy-Voting- Guidelines -for- Fidelity-
Funds-Advised-by-FMRCo- and- SelectCo.pdf ("Fidelity will generally vote for proposals
to ratify executive compensation unless such compensation appears misaligned with
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ers would ignore the interests of stockholders owning a majority of shares
and cause their corporations to refrain from business-usurping competition.
In the end, then, two key premises of common ownership critics' theoret-
ical argument are suspect. And if either is false, the argument is unsound.
B. Problems with the Evidence
When confronted with criticisms of their theory of anticompetitive harm,
proponents of common ownership restrictions generally point to the empiri-
cal evidence described above. 84 For example, the authors of the airline study
(two of whom were also co-authors of the banking study) offered the follow-
ing retort to critics who noted the absence of any mechanism by which intra-
industry diversified institutional investors induce firm managers to pull their
competitive punches: "This argument falls short of explaining why, empirical-
ly, taking into account shareholders' economic interests does help to explain
firms' product market behavior."85
Of course, to demonstrate "empirically" that institutional investors'
economic interests" influence their portfolio companies' "product market
behavior" (i.e., cause the companies to charge higher prices, etc.), researchers
would need to (1) correctly identify institutional investors' economic interests
with respect to their portfolio firms' product market behavior, and (2) estab-
lish that those interests cause firms to act as they do. On those crucial tasks,
the empirical studies purporting to show anticompetitive harm from institu-
tional investors' common ownership of competing firms fall short.
shareholder interests or otherwise problematic, taking into account ... [t]he alignment of
executive compensation and company performance relative to peers ...."); id. (observing
that in voting on matters concerning executive stock options, Fidelity will take into ac-
count "[t]he company's relative performance compared to other companies within the rel-
evant industry or industries"). It is also worth noting that the largest institutional investors
consistently back equity-based compensation for firm managers, which encourages maxi-
mization of own-firm profits. See, e.g., Vanguar's Proxy Vorng Guideknes, VANGUARD,
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/policies-and-guidelines/# ("Ap-
propriately designed stock-based compensation plans ... can be an effective way to align
the interests of long-term shareholders with the interests of management .... ); Proxy
Vorng Guidehinesfor U.S. Securities, BLACKROCK 6 (Feb. 2018) ("We believe director com-
pensation packages that are based on the company's long-term value creation and include
some form of long-term equity compensation are more likely to meet this goal" of align-
ing shareholder and management incentives.).
84 See supra notes 22-45 and accompanying text (discussing airline, banking, and executive
compensation studies).
85 Azar et al., supra note 31, at 6.
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1. Failure to Account Properjy for Institutional Investors' Economic Interests
To assess institutional investors' preferences for industry versus own-firm
profit maximization, the common ownership studies have examined the de-
gree of institutional investors' horizontal shareholding as revealed by their
filings under Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act.86 Section 13(f) re-
quires institutional investors with more than $100 million of assets under
management to report their stock holdings. 87 The common ownership studies
have assumed that an institutional investor reporting ownership of a siiilar
percentage of all the firms in an industry would prefer that no firm try to win
business from its rivals but that they all, instead, reduce competition so as to
maximize industry profits.
That assumption is unwarranted. To see why, consider how Section 13(f)
reports are compiled. They report an institutional investor's aggregate hold-
ings i.e., the sum of all the holdings of all the funds associated with that
institutional investor. 88 For example, when Vanguard reports that it owns 36
million shares of, say, Southwest Airlines, it means that the various Vanguard
mutual funds, in the aggregate, hold that many Southwest shares.
This sort of aggregate, or "threshold," reporting exaggerates the degree to
which institutional investors appear to benefit from maximization of industry
versus own-firm profits. Suppose, for example, that Vanguard reports a 6%
ownership of each of American, Delta, Southwest, and United Airlines (and
suppose further that those are the only airlines in the market). From that fact
alone, it might appear that Vanguard's investors, and thus Vanguard itself,
must prefer maximization of industry rather than own-firm profits. Van-
guard's actual preference, however, is not so clear.
Vanguard's total ownership of each airline is divided among its many
funds. Investors in those individual funds would have divergent preferences
as to whether the airlines should maximize industry or own-firm profits and,
if the latter, which airlines' profits should be maximized. Some Vanguard
funds, such as its 500 Index Fund (VFIAX) and its Total Stock Market Fund
(VTSIX), hold relatively equal stakes in American, Delta, Southwest, and
United. 89 They may do best when the firms soften their competition so as to
86 See Azar et al., supra note 22, at 1523-25; Azar et al., supra note 23, at 7-8.
87 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-l(a)(1) (2018).
88 See, Frequentl Asked Questions About Form 13F, SEC (Mar. 15, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm.
89 Vanguard Form N-Q, supra note 77 (reporting ownership of 1.577% of American, 1.516%
of Delta, 1.552% of Southwest, and 1.432% of United, with percentages based on number
of shares outstanding as of May 31, 2017). As a percentage of their Total Stock Market
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maximize industry rather than own-firm profits. Different competitive out-
comes, however, would be better for other Vanguard funds. For example:
* Vanguard's Value Index Fund (VIVAX) holds significant stakes
in American, Delta, and United (0.46%, 0.45%, and 0.42%, re-
spectively) but holds no Southwest stock.90 VIVAX does best if
United, American, and Delta usurp business from Southwest.
* Vanguard's Growth Index Fund (VIGRX) holds a significant
stake in Southwest (0.59%) but holds no stake in American, Del-
ta, or United. 91 Investors in VIGRX would prefer that Southwest
win business from American, Delta, and United.
* Vanguard's Mid-Cap Index Fund (VIMSX) and Mid-Cap Value
Index Fund (VMVIX) hold significant stakes in United (1.00%
and 0.321%, respectively) but hold no stock in American, Delta,
or Southwest.92 Investors in VIMSX and VMVIX would prefer
that United win business from American, Delta, and Southwest.
* Vanguard's PRIMECAP Core Fund (VPCCX) holds stakes in all
four major airlines, but its share of Southwest (1.49%) is twice its
share of American (0.72%), nearly four times its share of United
(0.38%), and seven-and-a-half times its share of Delta (0.198%).93
Investors in VPCCX would prefer that Southwest grow at the
expense of American, United, and Delta. They would also prefer
that American win business from United and Delta, and that
United win business from Delta.
* Vanguard's Morgan Growth Fund (VMRGX) holds stock in only
two airlines, United and Delta, and its stake in the former is near-
ly four times its stake in the latter (0.79% versus 0.210). 94
VMRGX investors want United and Delta to beat American and
Southwest, and where United and Delta compete head-to-head,
the investors would prefer that United win business from Delta.
Index Fund, Vanguard reported ownership of 2.072% of American, 1.990% of Delta,
2.153% of Southwest, and 1.853% of United, with percentages based on number of
shares outstanding as of May 31, 2017. Id.
90 Id. (referring to Vanguard Value Index Fund).
91 Id. (referring to Vanguard Growth Index Fund).
92 Id. (referring to Vanguard Mid-Cap Index Fund and Vanguard Mid-Cap Value Index
Fund).
93 Vanguard Fenway Funds, Quarterly Schedule of Portfolio Holdings of Registered Man-
agement Company (Form N-Q) (Aug. 28, 2017) (referring to Vanguard PRIMECAP Core
Fund).
94 Vanguard Morgan Growth Fund, Quarterly Schedule of Portfolio Holdings of Registered
Management Company (Form N-Q) (Aug. 28, 2017).
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* Vanguard's Mega Cap Growth Index Fund (VMGAX) holds on-
ly Southwest stock,95 so VIGAX investors want Southwest to
steal business from all its rivals. By contrast, investors in Van-
guard's Mega Cap Value Index Fund (VMVLX) want Southwest
to lose business to the other major carriers; V]VLX holds
American, Delta, and United stock, but no Southwest stock.96
In short, returns to retail investors in the funds of Vanguard and similar
institutions turn on fund performance, and the competitive outcome that
maximizes retail investors' profits will differ among funds.
Proponents of restrictions on common ownership might respond that
even if an institutional investor's individual funds have conflicting prefer-
ences, the institutional investor as an entity must have some preference about
whether to maximize industry profits or the profits of a particular company.
Because it cannot honor all its individual funds' conflicting preferences with
respect to competitive outcomes, the institutional investor will settle on the
compromise strategy that maximizes its individual funds' aggregate returns: in-
dustry profit maximization. Such a strategy would be the first choice of the
institution's funds holding relatively equal shares of all firms within a market.
And, while the first choice of the institution's funds that are disproportionate-
ly invested in one firm would be to maximize that firm's profits, those funds
would do better with industry profit maximization than with the first-choice
strategy of other of the institution's funds, i.e., those that are disproportion-
ately invested in different firms. Maximization of industry profits, then, would
be each fund's first or second choice and would constitute the strategy that
provides most value to the institutional investor's funds on the whole.
But even if maximization of industry profits leads to the greatest aggre-
gate returns for an institutional investor's funds (an unlikely outcome, given
that supracompetitive pricing in one industry depresses returns in comple-
mentary industries in which the funds are also invested),97 such a strategy may
not be the best outcome for the institutional investor itself. An institutional
investor typically wants to maximize its profits, which will grow as it attracts
retail investors into its funds versus those of its competitors and steers those
investors toward its highest margin funds i.e., those that earn it the greatest
95 Vanguard World Fund, Quarterly Schedule of Portfolio Holdings of Registered Manage-
ment Company (Form N-Q) (July 28, 2017) (referring to Vanguard Mega Cap Growth
Index Fund).
96 Id. (referring to Vanguard Mega Cap Value Index Fund).
97 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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profits (fees less costs). 98 To assess an institutional investor's preferences with
regard to the returns of its different funds, then, one must know (1) the de-
gree to which each fund's attractiveness vis-a-vis rivals' similar funds turns on
portfolio returns, and (2) the profit margin each fund delivers to the institu-
tional investor. The less important a fund's returns are to its retail attractive-
ness, the lower the weight the institutional investor will attach to that fund's
returns in determining what competitive outcome the institutional investor
prefers. And the higher a fund's profit margin for the institutional investor,
the greater the weight the institutional investor will attach to that fund's re-
turns.
For funds tracking popular stock indices, portfolio returns play little role
in winning business from rival fund sponsors. (For example, higher returns
on the stocks in the S&P 500 are unlikely to attract investors to BlackRock's
S&P 500 index fund over Fidelity's or Vanguard's.) Moreover, the fees
charged on such funds, and thus the institutional investor's potential profit
margins, are extraordinarily low. 99 For actively managed funds, portfolio re-
turns are far more significant in attracting investors, and management fees are
higher. The upshot is that an institutional investor, in determining what com-
petitive outcome it prefers, will attach little weight to the competitive prefer-
ences of passive index funds and more weight to the preferences of actively
managed funds, with that weight growing as the funds provide the institution-
al investor with higher profit margins.
It is quite possible, then, for an intra-industry diversified institutional in-
vestor to prefer a competitive outcome other than the maximization of indus-
try profits, even in the (unlikely) event that industry profit maximization
98 This may not be true for Vanguard. It is structured as a "mutual" mutual fund, meaning
that the company is owned by its funds, which are owned by retail investors. See, Whj
Ownershp Matters, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/what-sets-vanguard-apart/
why-ownership-matters/.
99 In 2016, the average expense ratio-i.e., annual fees divided by total fund amount-for an
equity mutual fund was 0.63%. INV. CO. INST., Fund Expenses and Fees, in 2017 INVEST
MENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE INVESTMENT
COMPANY INDUSTRY 86, 86-87, https://www.ici.org/pdf/2017 factbook.pdf. The ex-
pense ratios of the major index funds are much lower. See, e.g., Fidebo 500 Index Fund: Fees
and Distributions, FIDELITY INVESTMENTshttps://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-
funds/ fees-and-prices/ 315911206 (expense ratio of 0.015%); iShares S&P 500 Index Fund
Fees, BLACKROCK,https://www.blackrock.com/investmg/products/251378/blackrock-s-
p- 500-stock- fundinstl-class -fund (expense ratio of 0.11%); State Street Equip 500 Index
Fund, STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVIsORs https://www.ssgafumds.com/product/
fund.seam?ticker= sssyx (gross expense ratio of 0.11%; net expense ratio of 0.02%); Van-
,guard 500 Index Fund Admiral Shares. Fees &_ Minimums, VANGUARD
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/fumds/snapshot?FundlntExt= INT&Fundld=0540&f
unds disable-redirect= true#tab= 3 (expense ratio of 0.04%).
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would maximize the aggregate returns of its individual funds. 100 Consider, for
example, an institutional investor that offers funds similar to the following
Vanguard funds:
* Vanguard's 500 Index Fund (VFIAX) holds near equivalent in-
terests in American, Delta, Southwest, and United'01 and would
thus do best with a strategy of industry profit maximization. Its
expense ratio (annual fees divided by total fund amount) is 0.04
percent. 02
* Vanguard's Value Index Fund (VIVAX) holds similar stakes in
American, Delta, and United but does not hold Southwest
stock. 03 Its expense ratio is 0.17 percent. 04
* Vanguard's PRIMECAP Core Fund (VPCCX) fund holds a
much higher stake in Southwest than in the other airlines 05 and
has an expense ratio of 0.46 percent, 2.7 times as great as the no-
Southwest VIVAX fund and 11.5 times as high as the fully diver-
sified VFIAX fund. 06
* Vanguard's Capital Opportunity Fund (VHCAX) holds signifi-
candy higher shares of Southwest and United (1.74% and 1.55%,
respectively) than of Delta and American (0.65% and 1.16%, re-
spectively).' 07 Its expense ratio is 0.36, more than twice as great
as the no-Southwest VIVAX fund and 9.5 times the fully diversi-
fied VFIAX fund. 108
100 Again, maximization of industry profits is unlikely to maximize the returns of a fund that
is inter-industry diversified, as supracompetitive pricing in one industry tends to depress
returns in vertically related industries. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
102 Janguard 500 Index Fund Admiral Shares. Fees &_ Minimums, VANGUARD,
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/fumds/snapshot?FundlntExt= INT&Fundld=0540&f
unds disable-redirect= true#tab= 3.
103 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
104 Vanguard Value Index Fund Admiral Shares: Fees &_ Minimums, VANGUARD,
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/fumds/snapshot?FundlntExt= INT&Fundld=0506&f
unds disable-redirect= true#tab= 3.
105 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
106 Vanguard PRIMECAP Core Fund Fees &_ Minimums, VANGUARD,
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/fumds/snapshot?FundlntExt= INT&Fundld= 1220&f
unds disable-redirect= true#tab= 3.
107 Vanguard Horizon Funds, Quarterly Schedule of Portfolio Holdings of Registered Man-
agement Company (Form N-Q) (Aug. 28, 2017) (referring to Vanguard Capital Oppor-
tunity Fund).
108 Vanguard Capital Opportunip Fund Admiral Shares: Fees &_ Minimums, VANGUARD,
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/fumds/snapshot?FundlntExt=INT&Fundld=5111&f
unds disable redirect= true#tab= 3.
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This institutional investor's Southwest-heavy funds (those resembling
Vanguard's VPCCX and VHCAX funds) charge much higher fees than its
fully diversified index fund (the one resembling VFIAX, for which fund re-
turns are unimportant) and significantly higher fees than its funds that are
more heavily invested in airlines besides Southwest (those resembling VI-
VAX). Thus, despite being intra-industry diversified at the institutional level,
this institutional investor may do best if Southwest maximizes own-firm prof-
its.
This is not to suggest, of course, that intra-industry diversified institu-
tional investors will never do better with industry rather than own-firm profit
maximization. But it does show the impropriety of just assuming, as the
common ownership studies do, that an institutional investor that is intra-
industry diversified according to Section 13(f) filings has an "economic inter-
est" in the maximization of industry versus own-firm profits. Discerning the
institutional investor's actual economic interest requires drilling down to the
level of the individual funds, which the common ownership studies have not
done. Thus, contrary to the assertion of the airline study's authors, the com-
mon ownership studies have not shown "empirically" that "taking into ac-
count shareholders' economic interests does help to explain firms' product
market behavior."' 1 9 Indeed, they have never established what those econom-
ic interests are.
2. Failure to Establish a Causal Relationshjp Between Institutional Investors' Puported
Economic Interests and Market Outcomes
Even if institutional investors' aggregated holdings accurately revealed
their economic interests with respect to competitive outcomes, the common
ownership studies would still be deficient because they fail to show that those
economic interests caused portfolio firms' "product market behavior." As ex-
plained above, the common ownership studies employ MHMIA (or a similar
measure)"0 to assess institutional investors' interest in competition- softening.
They then correlate changes in that metric with changes in portfolio firms'
pricing behavior (or similar conduct)."' The problem is that MIHIA is itself
109 Azar et al., supra note 31, at 6.
110 The banking study utilizes GHHJ, an analog to MHHIA. See supra note 41 and accompa-
nying text.
* See supra notes 25-33, 40-44 and accompanying text. The banking study, which has been
less influential than the airline study, correlates GHHJ itself (not changes in the metric)
with various pricing practices. Despite this difference, the endogeneity criticism discussed
in the text following this note still applies.
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affected by factors that independently influence market prices. It is thus im-
proper to infer that changes in MIHIA caused changes in portfolio firms'
pricing practices; the pricing changes could have resulted from the very fac-
tors that changed MHHIA. In other words, MHHIA is an endogenous meas-
ure.
To see why this is so, consider how MHHIA is calculated. As Appendix
A explains, determining the MHHIA for a market essentially involves a three-
step process. The first step is to assess, for every coupling of competing firms
in the market (e.g., Southwest/Delta, United/American, Southwest/United,
etc.), the degree to which the controlling investors in each of the firms would
prefer that it avoid competing with the other. The second step considers the
market shares of the two firms in the coupling to determine the competitive
significance of their incentives not to compete with each other. (The idea is
that reduced head-to-head competition by bit players matters less for overall
market competition than does reduced competition by major players.) The
final step is to aggregate the effect of common ownership -induced competi-
tion-softening throughout the overall market by summing the softened com-
petition metrics for each coupling of competitors within the market.
Given this process for calculating MIHIA, there are at least two sources
of endogeneity in the metric. One arises because of the second step. To assess
the significance to market competition of any two firms' incentives to reduce
competition between themselves, the market shares of those two firms must
be incorporated into the metric. But factors that influence market shares may
also influence market prices apart from any common ownership effect.
Suppose, for example, that five institutional investors hold significant and
equal stakes (say, 3%) in each of the four airlines servicing a particular air
route and that none of the airlines has another significant shareholder. The air
route at issue is subject to seasonal demand fluctuations. In the low season,
the market is divided among the four airlines so that one has 40% of the
business and the other three have 20% each. The MLHIA for this market
would be 7200. When the high season rolls around, demand for flights along
the route increases, but the leading airline is capacity constrained, so addition-
al ticket sales go to the other airlines. The market shares of the airlines in the
high season are equal: 25% each.
On these facts, the increase in demand causes MHHIA to rise from 7200
to 7500. But the increase in demand is also likely to raise ticket prices. We
thus see an increase in MHHIA that correlates with an increase in ticket pric-
es, but the price change is not caused by the change in MHHIA. Instead, the
two changes have a common, independent cause.
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Endogeneity also creeps in during the third step in calculating MLHIA.
In that step, the "cross MIHIAs" of all the couplings in the market-the
metrics assessing for each coupling the extent to which common ownership
will cause the two firms to compete less vigorously-are summed. Thus, as
the number of firms participating in the market (and thus the number of cou-
plings) increases, the MHHIA will tend to rise. While HHI (the market con-
centration measure) will decrease as the number of competing firms rises, 112
MHHIA (the measure of common ownership pricing incentives) will increase.
For example, suppose again that five institutional investors hold equal
stakes (say, 3%) of each airline servicing a market and that the airlines have no
other significant shareholders. If there are two airlines servicing the market
and their market shares are equivalent, HHI will be 5000, MIHIA will be
5000, and MIHI (1-HI + M-HIA) will be 10000. If a third airline enters and
grows so that the three airlines have equal market shares, HHI will drop to
3333, M-HIA will rise to 6667, and M-HI will remain constant at 10000. If
a fourth airline enters and the airlines split the market evenly, HHI will fall to
2500, M-HIA will rise further to 7500, and M-HI will again total 10000.
This is problematic, because the number of participants in the market is
affected by consumer demand, which independently influences market prices.
In the market described above, for example, the third or fourth airline might
enter the market in response to an increase in demand, and that increase
might simultaneously cause market price to rise. We would see, then, a price
increase that is correlated with, but not caused by, an increase in MIHIA;
increased demand would be the cause of both the higher prices and the in-
crease in M-HIA.
As explained above, the authors of the airline study attempted to address
these endogeneity concerns by considering how MHHIA correlated with pas-
senger volume.113 They reasoned that if changes in demand, rather than
common ownership, were driving ticket prices, there would be a positive cor-
relation between M-HIA and passenger volume. In fact, they found the op-
posite: higher M-HIA correlated with lower passenger volume. 114 From that
finding, they inferred that higher prices accompanying increased M HIA
112 Recall that HHJ is the sum of the squares of the market shares of firms participating in
the market. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. With two equal-size firms (50%
market share), HHJ is 5000. With three equal-sized firms (33.3% market share), HHJ is
3333.
113 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
114 Azar et al., supra note 22, at 1541-44.
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must be caused by common ownership-induced competition-softening rather
than by increased demand. 115
This analysis of passenger volume, however, does not eliminate the en-
dogeneity concerns. MIHIA is determined in part by market shares; it rises
as commonly owned firms command greater shares of the market. Because
smaller airline markets-those with lower passenger volume-tend to attract
fewer carriers, the carriers servicing those routes will tend to have higher
market shares. Thus, one would expect MHHilA to be higher in markets with
lower passenger volume. That is not because common ownership results in a
reduction in quantity supplied, as the authors of the airline study assume. Ra-
ther, it is because of the way MIHIA is constructed.1 6
Subsequent studies that have attempted to correct the endogeneity defi-
ciencies in the airline study have found no statistically significant price in-
crease resulting from common ownership by institutional investors. One such
study, by Pauline Kennedy, Daniel O'Brien, Minjae Song, and Keith Waehrer,
first replicated the original airline study using its empirical methodology and
obtained similar results."1 The authors then analyzed the same data using a
different empirical approach: They correlated fares not with the endogenous
MHHIlA measure but with "common ownership incentive terms," metrics
designed to assess the weight that firm managers place on the profits of rival
firms when making management decisions."18 After running further tests to
115 Id.
116 The authors' attempt to alleviate endogeneity concerns via their analysis of BlackRock's
acquisition of Barclay's Global Investors (BGI) similarly falls short. The authors calculate
an "implied change" in MHHIA by comparing the actual MHHIA in 2009Q1, the quarter
immediately prior to the announcement of the acquisition, to what the MHHIA would
have been in 2009Q1 if the holdings of BlackRock and BGI were combined into a single
holding. Azar et al., supra note 22, at 1538-1540. The authors fail to recognize that the
implied change in MHHIA reflected not only the change in ownership across airlines, but
also the market shares of airlines in each market. In smaller markets with few airlines (i.e.,
few potential couplings), the likelihood of a large implied change is lower because there
are fewer potential couplings through which the incentive to soften competition would
take place. In larger markets, with more potential couplings, the increase in the implied
MHHIA would be larger. Consequently, the implied change in MHHIA reflects not only
implied differences in ownership, but differences in markets themselves. Since larger mar-
kets served by multiple airlines are also more likely than small markets to experience in-
creased demand and increased prices, the authors' finding of a positive correlation be-
tween implied change in MHHIA and price increases is, once again, spuriously deter-
mined.
117 Pauline Kennedy, Daniel P. O'Brien, Minjae Song & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive
Effects of Common Ownership: Economic Foundations and Empirical Evidence 14 (July
2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfi?abstract
id=3008331.
118 Id. at 4.
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eliminate any remaining endogeneity, the authors found "either no relation-
ship or a negative relationship between price and each common ownership
index." 119 At a minimum, this finding calls into question the robustness of the
original airline study, whose results appear to turn on a particular-and ques-
tionable-empirical methodology. 120
Patrick Dennis, JKristopher Gerardi, and Carola Schenone similarly found
no anticompetitive effect from common ownership when they replicated the
original airline study using a different metric for common ownership incen-
tives.121 The authors used an econometric instrument that is specific to the
airline industry and is designed to account for the fact that "concentration
causes price, but price also causes concentration."' 122 Their instrumental varia-
ble analysis found "no correlation between common ownership concentration
and average prices."'123
Dennis, Gerardi, and Schenone also conducted a number of other anal-
yses that call into question the robustness of the original airline study. First,
they eliminated "regression weighing" (weighing regressions by passenger
counts) on grounds that it is unjustified in this context. 124 That change alone
either eliminated or drastically reduced the effect of MHHIA on average
fares. 125 The authors then made four changes to the dataset to prevent poten-
tial distortions: (1) they omitted "code-shared" and "interline" tickets, both of
which involve multiple carriers on an itinerary, to eliminate uncertainty about
119 Id. at 5.
120 Kennedy et al. do not purport to have "proven" that common ownership has no, or a
negative, effect on airfares. They "view . . . [their] price regressions as a robustness analy-
sis of the results of... [the original airline study] rather than a robust analysis of common
ownership effects." Id. at 14.
121 See Patrick Dennis, Kristopher Gerardi & Carola Schenone, Common Ownership Does
Not Have Anti-Competitive Effects in the Airline Industry (Feb. 5, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssM.com/sol3/papers.cffmabstract id=3063465. The au-
thors of the original airline study maintain that Dennis et al. did not accurately replicate
the original study's dataset, rendering the second study "of limited usefulness in showing
the effect of deviations from [the original study's] empirical specifications." Josd Azar,
Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Rep# to: "Common Ownershp Does Not Have Anti-
Competitiive Effects in the Airne Industy" (April 24, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cffmabstract id=3168095. Even if the replication
by Dennis et al. was deficient, the divergent findings of the second study would seem to
undermine the robustness of the original airline study's results.
122 Dennis et al., supra note 121, at 5 (quoting William N. Evans, Luke M. Froeb & GregoryJ.
Werden, Endogenein in The Concentraion-Price relationship: Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 41 J.
INDUS. ECON. 431, 431-38 (1993)).
123 Id. (emphasis omitted).
124 Id. at 12-14.
125 Id. at 14.
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which carrier set the fare; 26 (2) they eliminated first and business class tickets
(which are more desirable than non-stop coach tickets) as well as tickets with
a stopover (which are less desirable than non-stop coach tickets) so as to as-
sure apples-to-apples comparisons; 2 7 (3) they set shareholders' control rights
to zero during periods of airline bankruptcy, when managers' fiduciary duties
run to creditors rather than to equity holders; 2 8 and (4) they assessed institu-
tional investors' control based only on shares over which they possessed
"sole," not "shared," voting rights. 2 9 When these sensible adjustments were
made, the anticompetitive effect observed in the original airline study disap-
peared.130
It thus seems that the airline and banking studies suffer from intractable
endogeneity problems and that the airline study, the more influential of the
two, is subject to a number of other methodological difficulties that render its
results far from robust. Empirical evidence is not, then, the trump card that
proponents of common ownership restrictions believe it to be.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE SOLUTIONS
Even if common ownership by institutional investors did cause some de-
gree of competition-softening in oligopolistic industries, the solutions schol-
ars have proposed for addressing that problem would not be justified. The
existence of a welfare-reducing defect in private ordering-e.g., a market fail-
ure-is a necessary but insufficient condition for a regulatory fix. Because regu-
latory intervention inevitably entails costs, policymakers should always ask
whether those costs would exceed the social losses the proposed intervention
would avert. They should intervene in private ordering only if confident that
their intervention would enhance social welfare. And, in choosing among
126 Id. at 4-5.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 15-16.
129 Id. at 17. In their Section 13(o filings, institutional investors must list the number of
shares they hold in a company and classify their voting rights with respect to those shares
as either "none" (e.g., the institution holds the shares but has no right to vote them),
"sole" (e.g., the institution holds the shares and has exclusive discretion over how they are
voted), or "shared" (e.g., the institution holds the stock and shares with another the dis-
cretion about how it is voted). Azar et al. adopted the questionable assumption that an in-
stitutional investor controls the shares over which it possesses only shared voting control.
See id. at 4.
130 Id. at 18.
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possible regulatory approaches (including the possibility of doing nothing)
they should select the one that is cost-minimizing.13 1
Such analysis requires consideration of three potential costs. First, there
are the losses that result from wrongly condemning or discouraging welfare-
enhancing behavior. Such "Type I" errors result when a ban reaches too far.
Losses also stem from the failure to condemn welfare-reducing instances of
the conduct at issue. Prohibitions that are under-inclusive generate such
"Type II" errors. Taken together, the welfare losses resulting from a regulato-
ry approach's false convictions and false acquittals comprise the approach's
error costs. 132 The third set of costs are those entailed in administering the
rule: Planners for regulatees incur costs in determining what conduct is for-
bidden and what permitted, and adjudicators incur costs in deciding whether
challenged behavior was or was not allowed. These costs to planners and ad-
judicators collectively comprise a regulatory approach's decision costs. 133
The three sets of costs-Type I error costs, Type II error costs, and deci-
sion costs-are intertwined. As one of us has elsewhere explained,
Shrinking the scope of a rule's prohibition to avoid false
convictions enhances the risk of false acquittals. Conversely,
expanding the prohibition to avoid false acquittals threatens
an increase in false convictions. Attempting to minimize
both false convictions and false acquittals simultaneously by
adding in exceptions and other nuances raises decision costs.
• . . As in a game of whack-a-mole, pushing down costs in
one spot just causes them to rise somewhere else. 134
In light of this inexorable tension, policymakers should not try to achieve
perfection along any single dimension. Rather than seeking to deter all bad
behavior, encourage all good behavior, or lower decision costs as much as
possible, they ought to optimize-that is, they should implement the regula-
tory approach most likely to minimize the sum of error and decision costs. 135
With respect to common ownership by institutional investors, the opti-
mal approach is almost certainly not one of those proposed by the scholars
who have called for enhanced antitrust intervention. To see why this is so,
131 See general9 THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW To REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 10-
15 (2017).
132 Id. at 10.
133 Id. at 11.
134 Id. at 11-12.
135 Id. at 12-13.
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consider the decision and error costs that would result from their pro-
posals. 13
A. Decision Costs
1. E/hauge 's Section 7 Approach
The leading proposal for addressing competition concerns arising from
common ownership is to use Section 7 of the Clayton Act to police horizon-
tal shareholding in oligopolistic industries. 137 While the terms of Section 7
make it illegal to "acquire" stock when doing so would substantially lessen
competition in a market, 38 Elhauge and other proponents of a Section 7 ap-
proach would assign liability not on the basis of investors' discrete acquisi-
tions of stock but on the basis of their aggregate ownersht of stakes in compet-
136 Some may quibble with our characterization of an antitrust solution as a "regulatory"
approach. While antitrust does not consist of ex ante regulation, we deem it to be regulato-
ry in the sense that it consists of legal directives that extend beyond the common law and
are aimed at addressing a welfare-reducing defect in private ordering (i.e., market power).
Seegenera/l LAMBERT, supra note 131, at 2-4 (defining regulation).
137 See Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1302-04. Elhauge has also argued that such common owner-
ship could be a combination in restraint of trade, creating liability under Sherman Act Sec-
tion 1, 15 U.S.C. §1. See Einer Elhauge, New Evidence, Proofs, and Legal Theories on
Horizontal Shareholding 29-33 (January 4, 2018) (unpublished article),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfiabstract id=3096812 [hereinafter, Elhauge,
New Evidence]; see also Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, HorizontalSharehol&ng
andAntrst Po, g, 127 YALE L.J. 2026, 2033 (2018) (discussing possibility that horizontal
shareholding could give rise to Section 1 violation). A Section 1 theory would likely be less
attractive to plaintiffs than a Section 7 theory. Section 1 prohibits only unreasonable re-
straints of trade, see Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918), and under
a Rule of Reason analysis, intra-industry diversified institutional investors could argue that
the complained of horizontal "combination" (ownership of minority stakes in competing
firms) was reasonable because it facilitated the creation of a valuable product: a highly di-
versified mutual fund with extremely low costs because of the lack of any need to exercise
investment discretion. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979) (restraint of trade was reasonable where it facilitated creation of a new product).
Because Section 7 has been interpreted to forbid crediting extra-market efficiencies in de-
termining whether an acquisition lessens competition in a particular market, see United
States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (rejecting argument that reduced
competition in market for smaller loans could be offset by efficiencies in a different mar-
ket for larger loans); see also 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW 972 (4th ed. 2015), defendants may have less success with a reasonableness defense
in a Section 7 action.
138 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018) ("No person shall acquire ... any part of the stock .. .of one or
more persons engaged in commerce .. .where in any line of commerce .. .the effect of
such acquisition ... may be substantially to lessen competition ....").
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ing firms. 139 Aggregating acquisitions appears consistent with Supreme Court
precedents on Section 7 and would be necessary to prevent institutional in-
vestors from evading liability by amassing significant common ownership in a
piecemeal fashion. 140
The touchstone for liability, then, would be any pattern of horizontal
shareholding that could substantially lessen competition within some market.
The most likely means of identifying such an illicit pattern of ownership
would be through the use of M-HIA or a similar metric. Indeed, Elhauge has
proposed MIHI-based thresholds for public enforcement, suggesting that
the federal antitrust agencies "should investigate any horizontal stock acquisi-
tions that have created, or would create, a AMHHI of over 200 in a market
with an MHHI over 2500, in order to determine whether those horizontal
stock acquisitions raised prices or are likely to do so."' 141 Liability would pre-
sumably result where (1) common ownership has led to a market in which
MHHI and MIHIA exceed 2500 and 200, respectively (or some similar
thresholds); and (2) there are indications that common ownership has had, or
threatens, an adverse price effect in that market. 142
The decision costs of this approach-the costs of planning and adjudica-
tion-would be quite significant. With respect to adjudication, a court or oth-
er tribunal would have to accomplish at least five tasks, each of which is diffi-
cult:
1. The court would first have to define the relevant product
and geographic market. Market definition is of course re-
quired in much antitrust adjudication, but it is never an easy
task. In the airline study, for example, there have been ques-
tions about whether the product market should include only
economy tickets or first class as well143 and whether the geo-
graphic market should be defined according to airport pair-
139 Elhauge, New Evidence, supra note 137, at 8; Scott Morton & Hovenkamp, supra note 137,
at 2047 ("Section 7 enables the antitrust enforcement agencies to reach back in time and
aggregate small purchases, which is critical in enforcement against institutional investors
that slowly accumulate large positions over time.").
140 See United States v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 241 (1975) (observing that 'ac-
quisition' can mean, and in the context of [Section] 7 of the Clayton Act does mean, both
the purchase of rights in another company and the retention of those rights").
141 Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1303. Elhauge has also called for enforcement by state attorneys
general through parens patriae actions and for private class action lawsuits by aggrieved
consumers. Id. at 1304.
142 As explained above, the MHHI and MHHIA thresholds that would give rise to potential
antitrust liability (2500 and 200, respectively) are both arbitrary and, in light of the upper
limit of MHHIA, quite low. See supra note 54.
143 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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ings (Dulles to O'Hare) or city pairings (Washington, D.C. to
Chicago) .144
2. Having defined a product market of appropriate geographic
scope, the court would have to determine MHHI and
MHHIA for that market. This is a routine, but hardly simple,
calculation, as Appendix A reveals. Moreover, because
MHHI and MIHIA depend in part on institutional inves-
tors' control rights, 145 disputes are sure to ensue over how to
assess an institutional investor's control where, for example,
a period of bankruptcy has shifted managers' fiduciary duties
in favor of debtholders, 146 or where the institutional investor
shares voting rights with beneficial owners,147 or where the
issuing firm has multiple classes of stock possessing different
control rights. Adjudicators would have to resolve these
thorny disputes in order to calculate MHHI and MIHIA.
3. Once they determined that the relevant MIHI and MHHIA
thresholds were met, adjudicators would have to decide
whether the evidence showed that common ownership in
the relevant market had caused, or threatened to cause, an
anticompetitive effect. In markets in which an econometric
study had been performed, the adjudicator would have to as-
sess the study's empirical methodology and any criticisms
thereof. If the plaintiff sought to show threatened harm by
citing empirical evidence from another market, the adjudica-
tor would have to assess the robustness of that evidence for
the market studied and determine whether that comparator
market was similar enough to support inferences about likely
competitive effects in the market at issue. The complicated
disputes over the methodologies employed in the airline and
banking studies suggest that these sorts of questions would
exceed the competence of most judges and virtually all juries.
4. Having concluded that common ownership caused an anti-
competitive effect in a market, the adjudicator would have to
determine the magnitude of that effect. Quantifying the
damage (e.g., overcharge) occasioned by common ownership
144 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
145 See O'Brien & Waehrer, supra note 28, at 737-38; Posner et al., supra note 3, at 682-83.
146 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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would be nigh unto impossible. Indeed, in the airline study,
the range of overcharge purportedly resulting from common
ownership was from three to twelve percent. 148 An adjudica-
tor deciding an actual case would have to settle on some-
thing more precise than that.
5. Finally, the adjudicator would have to answer a nearly intrac-
table question: How should the economic harm from com-
mon ownership be allocated among the investors holding
stakes in multiple firms in the industry? As Posner et al. have
observed, "M-HIA is a 'collective responsibility' of the
holding pattern" in markets in which there are multiple intra-
industry diversified investors. 149 It would not work to assign
liability only to those diversified investors who could sub-
stantially reduce MIHIA by divesting, for oftentimes the
unilateral divestment of each institutional investor from the
market would occasion only a small reduction in MLHIA.50
An aggressive court might impose joint liability on all intra-
industry diversified investors, but the investor(s) from whom
plaintiffs collected would likely seek contribution from the
other intra-industry diversified investors. Denying contribu-
tion seems intolerably inequitable, but how would a court
apportion damages?
As great as the decision costs for adjudicators would be under a Section 7
approach, the decision costs facing business planners would likely swamp
them. Like adjudicators, planners for institutional investors would first have
to define relevant antitrust markets (product markets of appropriate geo-
graphic scope). But whereas an adjudicator would have to define the contours
of only the market in which anticompetitive harm is alleged, planners seeking
to avoid liability would have to define every market in which their portfolio
companies from the same industry competed, either as output sellers or as
input buyers.'5 '
For each such market, then, business planners would have to calculate
MHHI and MIHIA to ensure that at least one of those metrics remained
below the threshold of concern (e.g., 2500 for MIHI, 200 for MHHIA). In-
148 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
149 Posner et al., supra note 3, at 693.
150 Id. at 692-93 (offering example to illustrate that unilateral divestment may have little ef-
fect on MHHIA).
151 This is because Section 7 forbids stock acquisitions that substantially lessen competition
"in any line of commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
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stitutional investors could not avoid liability simply by refraining from any
activity that would encourage their portfolio companies to hold back on mar-
ket competition, for the underlying theory of anticompetitive harm assumes
that competition-softening will occur without any action from institutional
investors. 5 2 This means that the only way to avoid liability would be to ab-
stain from common ownership in markets in which MIHI and MIHIA ex-
ceed the relevant thresholds.
But it would not be enough just to ensure that MIHI or MIHIA was
sufficiently low at the time the institutional investor acquired stakes in com-
peting firms. To ensure against antitrust liability, planners for institutional
investors would have to engage in perpetual monitoring of the markets in
which their portfolio companies compete to see if MHI--l and M-HIA had
changed. Because a market's MHHI and MHHIA are influenced by the mar-
ket shares of participating firms, the ownership percentages of intra-industry
diversified investors, and the ownership percentages of non-diversified share-
holders, 5 3 an institutional investor holding stakes in competing firms could
find itself at risk of antitrust liability if the market shares of its portfolio firms
rose, if other intra-industry diversified investors altered their holdings of firms
within the industry, or if major non-diversified shareholders reduced their
stakes. 5 4 Planners for an institutional investor holding stakes in competing
firms would have to recalculate MHHIl and M-HIA on a near daily basis to
ensure that the investor's stockholding-the one thing the investor can con-
trol-could not be deemed to have contributed to a softening of competition.
Of course, there are two ways planners for institutional investors could
avoid these enormous decision costs. They could refrain from performing the
152 According to Elhauge:
The problem is structural. Horizontal shareholders clearly benefit less from
competition among the firms in which they are invested. Corporate rights and
markets are designed to make sure managers primarily operate corporations in
the interests of their shareholders. Thus, increased horizontal shareholdings will
structurally lead businesses to compete less vigorously against each other. This
anticompetitive effect does not require any communication between the man-
agements of different corporations, because each corporation's management
has its own incentives to compete less in order to please its own shareholders.
Nor does the anticompetitive effect require any communication between share-
holders and managers, because managers know whether their leading share-
holders are horizontal and know that lessening competition benefits those
shareholders.
Elhauge, supra note 30, at 2; see also Posner et al., supra note 3, at 685-86 (discussing how
competition-softening could occur without investor action).
153 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text; see also Appendix A (describing process for
calculating MHHIA).
154 See Posner et al., supra note 3, at 692-94.
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analysis set forth above, continue their current investment strategies, and just
"roll the dice" on potential antitrust liability, hoping that adverse price effects
would not occur in the markets in which their portfolio companies compete.
Alternatively, they could abandon their current investment strategies and re-
frain from holding stakes in multiple firms that compete in any markets that
might be deemed oligopolistic. 55 If they took the former tack, a Section 7
approach would create no benefit in terms of deterring anticompetitive harm
and would amount to no more than a costly redistribution scheme. If they
pursued the latter strategy, the savings in decision costs would come at the
expense of a significant increase in error costs. We describe those error costs
in Section III.b below. 56
First, though, we consider whether the enforcement policy proposed by
Eric Posner, Fiona Scott Morton, and Glen Weyl could reduce the decision
costs that would result from using Section 7 to police investors' intra-industry
diversification.
2. Posner et al's Enforcement Poliy
Posner et al. agree that Section 7 should be used to restrict common
ownership by institutional investors. They are concerned, though, that Section
7 litigation could create "chaos" in the absence of "clear guidelines for when
such cases would or would not be brought."' 5 Accordingly, they advocate
155 Elhauge has suggested that institutional investors could reduce the risk of antitrust liabil-
ity, while holding stakes in competing firms, if they committed not to vote their shares or
to engage in "mirror voting" (i.e., voting their shares in proportion to how all other shares
were voted). Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1315. He concedes, though, that such a strategy
could not guarantee that antitrust liability would not ensue. Id. ("This alternative of avoid-
ing any voting influence lowers the risk of antitrust liability, but it may not eliminate that
risk because such nonvoting stock might still influence management in anticompetitive
ways."). Because the precise mechanism by which common ownership has its purported
effect on competition has not been identified, see Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note
137, at 2031 ("The theoretical literature to date does not identify what mechanism funds
may use to soften competition."), institutional investors that committed to refrain from
voting or to engage in mirror voting would run the risk that an adjudicator would decide
that firm managers defer to the interests of even passive investors. For example, a court
might decide that managers are influenced by the threat that institutional investors will sell
their shares, causing an adverse effect on the company's stock price. See Posner et al., supra
note 3, at 712 (explaining that pure passivity requires more than just abstention from vot-
ing, given that institutional investors may exercise influence via threats of exit).
156 See infra notes 173-205 and accompanying text.
157 Posner et al., supra note 3, at 691.
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"an enforcement policy issued by the DOJ and the FTC analogous to the
[Horizontal Merger] Guidelines."' 15 8
Under the proposed policy, the enforcement agencies would compile an-
nual lists of industries deemed oligopolistic. 5 9 The agencies would then direct
their enforcement resources against institutional investors that (1) owned at
least 1% of the outstanding equity in one of those industries, (2) held shares
of multiple firms within the industry, and (3) did not commit to being fully
passive, which entails (a) refraining from communication with portfolio firms
within the iidustry, (b) engaging only in "mirror voting" (i.e., voting one's
shares in proportion to the overall shareholder vote), and (c) following a clear,
verifiable investment strategy that eliminates investment discretion and there-
by precludes divestments that could punish the managers of portfolio
firms. 160 Under such a policy, an institutional investor could avoid liability by
either (1) holding less than 1% of the equity in an oligopolistic industry, (2)
owning stock in only one firm within such an industry, or (3) committing to
full passivity, as defined.
On first glance, this enforcement policy might appear to reduce decision
costs: Business planners would have to do less investigation to avoid liability
if they could rely on trustworthy, easily identifiable safe harbors; adjudicators'
decision costs would fall if the enforcement policy made it easier to identify
illicit investment patterns. Upon further reflection, however, the proposed
enforcement policy appears unlikely to reduce the decision costs of business
planners and adjudicators. Moreover, it would impose tremendous new deci-
sion costs on the public enforcement agencies.
To see why the enforcement policy is unlikely to reduce the decision
costs of planners and adjudicators, consider the possible effects it could have
in private antitrust lawsuits:
1. No Effect (Neither Sword nor Shield). The enforcement poli-
cy might operate as no more than a genuine enforcement poli-
cy-i.e., an ex ante statement of the circumstances under which
the public enforcement agencies may take action against an insti-
158 Id. at 709.
159 The proposed enforcement policy contemplates that:
[p]rior to the start of each calendar year, the DOJ and FTC would make a list of
industries constituting ohgopohs .... There would be some mechanism to solicit
comments from any interested parties. The DOJ and FTC would then finalize
the list with at least a month before the beginning of the new year to allow the
institutional investors time to rearrange their holdings to comply with the poli-
cy.
Id. at 708-09 (emphasis in original).
160 Id. at 712.
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tutional investor. 161 If the influence of the policy were so limited,
it would have no effect in private lawsuits against intra-industry
diversified investors.
2. Sword but not Shield. Courts could venture beyond the stated
effect of the enforcement policy and view it as setting forth a
sufficient, but not necessary, condition for antitrust liability. In
other words, they might conclude that investment behavior that
could give rise to enforcement under the policy would subject an
investor to private antitrust liability, but an investor would not be
automatically exonerated by investing in a manner that would not
invite public enforcement action. This would allow private plain-
tiffs to use the policy offensively, but it would provide no de-
fense to defendants.
3. Shield but not Sword. Conversely, courts might treat the en-
forcement policy as stating a necessary, but insufficient, condi-
tion for antitrust liability. Were courts to follow this approach,
investors could ensure against liability by investing in a way that
would not draw public enforcement. But, if investors did not
remain within the safe harbor, plaintiffs would have an oppor-
tunity to prove Section 7 liability by establishing that the defend-
ant's common ownership contributed to MHHI and MLHIA
above certain thresholds in some market, causing actual or
threatened anticompetitive effects in that market.
4. Both Sword and Shield. Finally, courts might maximally simpli-
fy their task by allowing the enforcement policy to define fully
the contours of Section 7 liability, stating both a sufficient and a
necessary condition for such liability. In other words, they might
reason that investors whose pattern of holdings would invite
public enforcement had violated Section 7, but that those whose
161 That is, of course, the official effect of enforcement policies. As experience with the Hor-
izontal Merger Guidelines has shown, however, adjudicators often do not afford antitrust
enforcement policies such limited effect. See, e.g., Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC, 534
F.3d 410, 431 n.l (5th Cir. 2008) ("Merger Guidelines are often used as persuasive au-
thority when deciding if a particular acquisition violates anti-trust laws."); United States v.
Kinder, 64 F.3d 757, 771 & n.22 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Although it is widely acknowledged that
the Merger Guidelines do not bind the judiciary in determining whether to sanction a cor-
porate merger or acquisition for anticompetitive effect.., courts commonly cite them as
a benchmark of legality."); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1120,
1120, 1128-32 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("Although the Merger Guidelines are not binding, courts
have often adopted the standards set forth in the Merger Guidelines in analyzing antitrust
issues.").
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investments would not attract public enforcement were immune
from liability.
Whether and to what extent Posner et al.'s enforcement policy would re-
duce decision costs would depend on which of these treatments courts af-
forded the policy. If courts viewed the policy as having no effect in private
lawsuits (public enforcement policy only) or as setting forth sufficient but not
necessary conditions for antitrust liability (sword but not shield), the policy
would have little or no effect on decision costs. Because private lawsuits
could proceed against even investors whose holdings would not invite public
enforcement action, institutional investors would still have to assess their lia-
bility risk by determining MHHI and MIHIA in all markets in which they
were intra-industry diversified. And, if such private lawsuits were filed, adjudi-
cators would have to engage in all of the analysis described above.
The proposed enforcement policy might reduce some decision costs if
courts treated the policy as creating a safe harbor in private lawsuits, a result
of the third and fourth approaches discussed above. If courts viewed the en-
forcement policy as fully defining the contours of Section 7 liability (both
sword and shield), then neither business planners nor adjudicators would
have to define markets, measure MHI-lI and MHHIA, or determine whether
common ownership had caused or threatened an anticompetitive effect; all
planners and adjudicators would have to decide is whether the investor (1)
held more than 1% of the equity in an industry declared oligopolistic, (2)
owned stock in multiple competitors in that industry, and (3) was not fully
passive, as defined, within the industry. If courts treated the policy as stating
necessary but not sufficient conditions for liability (shield but not sword),
business planners and adjudicators could avoid the decision costs discussed
above if, but only if, each investor held stock in a pattern that would not in-
vite public enforcement.162
It is highly unlikely, though, that courts would view the proposed en-
forcement policy as creating a safe harbor in private antitrust litigation. In
what is surely an understatement, Posner et al. acknowledge that "[t]he crea-
tion of [the oligopolies] list may be a substantial effort if the agencies attempt
to exhaustively analyze every industry in the United States at one time."163
They say that "the agencies should begin the list with industries where there is
empirical evidence of competition problems due to common ownership or
162 If an investor chose to exit the safe harbor, its business planners would need to engage in
the aforementioned analysis to assess antitrust risk, and, if it were sued, adjudicators
would have to incur the costs of determining whether the Section 7 liability test was satis-
fied.
163 Posner et al., supra note 3, at 698.
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other clear empirical evidence of concentration" and add to it annually "[a]s
different types of evidence accumulate over time."'164 The proposed policy
thus contemplates that the list of oligopolistic industries, at least at the outset,
will not be exhaustive. Moreover, because industry structures change all the
time, there could be no assurance that the list of oligopolies was complete at
any particular moment. A court could not very well conclude that failure to
attract public enforcement under an admittedy under-inclusive screening mechanism
should imply legality. Accordingly, the proposed enforcement policy would
not create a reliable safe harbor and therefore would not reduce decision
costs substantially.
Instead, the proposed enforcement policy would cause decision costs to
skyrocket by saddling the enforcement agencies with the herculean task of
compiling annual lists of oligopolies. For at least four reasons, the decision
costs associated with that undertaking would far outweigh those the agencies
incur in performing their most closely analogous task, defining antitrust mar-
kets in merger cases165 :
* A Greater Volume of Decisions. In recent years, around 50
merger reviews per year have proceeded to the point at which
precise market definition is required. 166 The proposed enforce-
ment policy, by contrast, would require the agencies to evaluate
164 Id.
165 Even the relatively "simple" task of defining markets in merger cases has often proven
difficult for the agencies. In recent years, for example, antitrust enforcers have had to re-
solve such thorny disputes as whether there is a separate market consisting of "premium
natural and organic supermarkets" that is separate from the market consisting of conven-
tional supermarkets, see Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Whole Foods Mvlkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028,
1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 2008); whether top-loading washers and drers are in the same
product market as front-loading units, see DIANA MOss, AM. ANTITRUST INST., ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS OF WHIRLPOOL'S PROPOSED ACQUISITION OF MAYTAG 5-10 (2006),
https://www.antitrustnstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/477.pdf, and whether
there is a separate market, which would not include Amazon and Walmart, for retail pro-
vision of consumable office supplies to large business -to-business consumers, see Michael
B. Bernstein, Justin P. Hedge & Francesca M. Pisano, FTCs Success in Staples/Ojice Depot
Showcases Trends in Ageng Merger Enforcement Strateg, ARNOLD & PORTER ADVISORY ALERT
(June 8, 2016), https://www.amoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2016/06/
ftcs-success-in-staples-office-depot.
166 In fiscal year 2016, for example, 238 mergers were cleared to one of the enforcement
agencies for review, meaning that there was enough concern about a potential competitive
problem to justify careful consideration of whether to make a "second request" for in-
formation from the merging parties. 39 U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
HART- SCOTT-RODINO ANN. REP. Table III (2016). In only 54 of those cases did an agen-
cy actually issue a second request. Id. at Table IV. Merger challenges were initiated in 47
cases, and only 20 of those resulted in administrative or federal court litigation. Id. at 2.
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thousands of industries to determine if they might be oligopolis-
tic.
* More Difficult Questions. In merger review, antitrust "market"
has come to mean something fairly precise: a grouping of prod-
ucts or services, within a particular geographic area, where the
cross-elasticity of demand for the products within the geographic
boundaries is sufficiently high that a hypothetical single seller
could not profitably impose a small but significant, non-
transitory increase in price (SSNIP).167 The term "industry," by
contrast, has no such economically informed, tractable defini-
tion. 68 Absent some sort of metric like the SSNIP test, defining
the boundaries of an industry in any non-arbitrary fashion will be
quite difficult. Moreover, once an industry is defined, there will
have to be criteria for declaring it to be oligopolistic. How many
competitors must there be, and of what scale, for a market not to
be oligopolistic? And what percentage of markets within an in-
dustry must be oligopolies before the industry itself is oligopolis-
tic? These are difficult questions for which answers do not cur-
rently exist.
* Constant Updating Required. Both the contours and the
competitiveness of many product markets, especially those in-
volving high-technology products or services, can change quick-
ly. Whereas enforcement authorities must define the market only
once in a merger case, it would not be enough for them to make
a one-time judgment that an industry is oligopolistic; they would
have to engage in constant monitoring to see whether entry,
product development, or changes in consumer tastes had altered
a designated industry so as to render it no longer oligopolistic.
* Enhanced Public Choice Concerns. While the parties to a
challenged merger will spend great sums to secure a favorable
market definition, non-parties rarely expend significant resources
to influence how antitrust markets are defined in merger cases. If
the agencies were to designate entire industries as oligopolistic,
however, interest groups would almost certainly join the fray.
Having their industry designated oligopolistic would raise the an-
167 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at § 4.1, 4.2.
168 Unlike the market definition used in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the federal gov-
ernment's Standard Industrial Classification system is in no way designed to illuminate po-
tential market power.
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titrust risk firms face from all sorts of practices. 16 9 For example,
every intra-industry joint venture would be viewed with greater
suspicion; parallel conduct among industry participants would
more likely be characterized as an agreement; vertical restraints
such as exclusive dealing, tie-ins, vertical territorial limitations,
and resale price maintenance would be at greater risk of being
deemed unreasonable; unilateral actions that make it harder for
new entrants and fringe competitors to gain a foothold (struc-
tured discounts, etc.) would receive additional scrutiny; consum-
mating mergers would be more difficult. In light of this en-
hanced antitrust risk (not to mention the risk that official desig-
nation as an oligopoly could spark direct regulation), industry
participants could be expected to mount a vigorous opposition
to any attempt to designate their industry as oligopolistic. At the
same time, groups with an interest in heightened antitrust scruti-
ny within an industry-e.g., consumer groups, vertically related
firms that could benefit from greater restriction on industry par-
ticipants-would invest resources to secure the industry's inclu-
sion on the list of oligopolies. Indeed, the proposal by Posner et
al. invites interest group involvement (and the social costs associ-
ated therewith) by specifying that "[t]here would be some mech-
anism to solicit comments from any interested parties."' i 0
In the end, then, Posner et al.'s enforcement policy would likely increase
the decision costs of using Section 7 to police institutional investors' common
ownership of competing firms.
There is, of course, a scenario in which many of the decision costs of a
Section 7 approach could be avoided. If institutional investors were to re-
spond to the threat of Section 7 liability by ceasing to invest in multiple firms
that compete in any concentrated markets or by remaining fully passive at
such firms,'7l then their business planners would not need to make costly as-
169 Posner et al. "recommend that the agencies state that the oligopoly list is solely for en-
forcing investor ownership of competitors and has no legal force in other settings, such as
merger analysis." Posner et al., supra note 3, at 698. But nothing would stop an antitrust
plaintiff from seeking to bolster its case by pointing out that the defendant is a member of
an "officially designated oligopoly," and it is hard to imagine factfinders just ignoring such
designation. The authors' claim that "there is no cost to industry participants ... from
classifying an industry as an oligopoly," id., therefore seems implausible.
170 Id. at 709.
171 As noted, full passivity would require institutional investors to engage in mirror voting
only, to avoid any communication with the management of portfolio companies, and to
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sessments of antitrust risk, and adjudicators could avoid the difficult inquiries
detailed above.' 2 But this outcome, which appears to be the intended result
of the proposals by Elhauge and Posner et al., would create substantial error
costs.
B. Error Costs
Relative to the regulatory status quo-doing nothing about institutional
investors' common ownership of small stakes in competing firms-a regula-
tory approach that drove institutional investors in concentrated industries
either to forego intra-industry diversification or to remain fully passive would
probably reduce Type II error costs. 173 If horizontal shareholding has any ad-
verse competitive effect in any concentrated industry, and if that effect stems
from the fact that the intra-industry diversified investors are not wholly pas-
sive and thus have some influence on the behavior of their portfolio firms,
then a regulatory approach that achieved the aforementioned result would
reduce some anticompetitive harms. For reasons set forth above, we doubt
that such harms are significant, if they exist at all. 174 We must, however, give
credit where credit is due: The regulatory approaches promoted by Elhauge
and Posner et al. may reduce some welfare losses that stem from institutional
investors' common ownership of firms that compete in concentrated markets.
Any reduction in Type II error costs, however, would be far outweighed
by an increase in Type I error costs. Indeed, each of the two possible results
of stepped-up antitrust intervention-preclusion of intra-industry diversifica-
tion in concentrated markets or inducement of full passivity by intra-industry
diversified investors-would generate significant losses. The former would do
so by eliminating welfare-enhancing product offerings, the latter by prevent-
ing cost-reducing conduct.
commit to an investment strategy with no investment discretion. See supra note 160 and
accompanying text.
172 This outcome would not eliminate the decision costs resulting from the enforcement
agencies' having to designate oligopolistic industries under the enforcement policy pro-
posed by Posner et al.
173 Recall that the error costs of a regulatory approach are the welfare losses from precluding
welfare-enhancing behavior (Type I errors) and from failing to prevent welfare -reducing
behavior (Type II errors). See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
174 See supra Part II.
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1. Error Costs from Precluding Intra-Industy Diversification
Driving institutional investors to refrain from intra-industry diversifica-
tion would eliminate a multitude of investment products that many retail in-
vestors prefer. Most index funds would disappear, as nearly all significant
stock indices include multiple competitors from concentrated industries. It is
no answer to say that index funds could be offered as long as fund managers
invested in only one of the indexed competitors from each concentrated in-
dustry, for any fund that was so managed would not be a true index fund, the
defining characteristic of which is a lack of investment discretion on the part
of fund managers. One reason index funds have such low costs, and thus
charge lower fees to retail investors, is that fund managers never have to
make decisions about which companies to invest in.
Inducing each institutional investor to select only one competitor per
concentrated industry would also reduce the number of actively managed mu-
tual funds available to retail investors. Because critics of common ownership
maintain that intra-industry diversification at the institutional investor /evel is suffi-
cient to induce competition-softening in concentrated markets,' 5 it would not
be enough for institutional investors to ensure that each of their funds was
invested in only one firm within an oligopolistic industry. Rather, each institu-
tional investor would have to settle on one firm per concentrated industryfor
all its funds. This requirement would impede institutional investors' ability to
offer a variety of actively managed funds organized around distinct invest-
ment strategies-e.g., growth, value, income etc. If, for example, Southwest
Airlines were a growth stock and United Airlines a value stock, an institution-
al investor could not offer both a growth fund including Southwest and a val-
ue fund including United. Although it is possible that new fund families
would emerge to offer the investment products eliminated by a "one-
oligopoly- stock-per-institutional -investor" policy, such entrants' reduced scale
would result in higher costs and fees, and those disadvantages could very well
prevent their emergence altogether.
Finally, institutional investors' eschewal of intra-industry diversification
would prevent them from designing funds that bet on an industry as a whole
while limiting exposure to company-specific risks within that industry. Sup-
175 See supra text between notes 96 and 97. The idea is that because institutional investors with
multiple funds cannot honor the first-choice competitive preference of each fund (as
funds invested in different competitors will prefer different outcomes), they will settle on
the outcome that provides each fund its first or second choice and thereby maximizes the
aggregate returns of the institutional investors' funds. That outcome is maximization of
industry profits.
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pose, for example, that a financial crisis led to a precipitous drop in the stock
prices of all commercial banks. A retail investor might reasonably conclude
that the market had overreacted with respect to the industry as a whole, that
the industry would likely rebound, but that some commercial banks would
probably fail. Such an investor would wish to invest in the commercial bank-
ing sector but to hold a diversified portfolio within that sector. A legal regime
that drove fund families to avoid intra-industry diversification would prevent
them from offering the sort of fund this investor would prefer. Posner et al.
retort that "nearly all the gains from diversification ... can be secured by di-
versifying across industries" and that "[t]he gains from within-industry diversi-
fication turn out to be very small."176 But even small gains are gains, and it is
not at all difficult to envision situations in which retail investors would benefit
from the sort of intra-industry diversified funds that the proposals by Elhauge
and Posner et al. would eliminate.
2. Brror Costs from Inducing Full Passiviy
If institutional investors were to respond to potential antitrust liability not
by avoiding intra-industry diversification but by remaining fully passive in any
concentrated industries in which they were diversified, the aforementioned
error costs could be avoided. In that case, however, another set of significant
error costs would emerge: increased agency costs.
As Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously observed, large public cor-
porations are characterized by a separation of ownership and control; the re-
sidual claimants of such corporations, the shareholders, have little control
over the managers of the businesses, the directors and officers.'77 This separa-
tion of ownership and control may lead managers to direct firm resources not
to their highest and best ends, as the owners would prefer and efficiency de-
mands, but to ends that create personal benefits for the managers.' 8 Owner-
principals may respond to this temptation by monitoring the controller-agents
(e.g., through auditing, imposition of internal controls, etc.), and controllers
may seek to guarantee their fidelity by engaging in costly bonding (e.g., by
176 Posner et al., supra note 3, at 679; see also Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1314 (observing that
"investing in only one of the competing firms" in a concentrated market "would produce
only a minimal loss of diversification benefits because institutional investors can remain
invested in one firm in each concentrated market and thus remain diversified across all
industries in the economy").
177 See genera/9 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 128-31, 244-53 (Routledge, 2d ed. 1991).
178 Seegenera/l LAMBERT, supra note 131, at 94-96.
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procuring certifications or licenses or by agreeing to limit their future activi-
ties).'l v Taken together, principals' monitoring costs, agents' bonding costs,
and the residual inefficiency that results when agents still misallocate re-
sources constitute agency costs, which are social welfare losses.180 If a regula-
tory effort aimed at reducing welfare losses from reduced competition some-
how increases agency costs, that increase is an error cost of the regulatory
effort. Because both economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that
institutional investors, if non-passive, significantly reduce agency costs at their
portfolio firms, a regulatory approach that induced passivity on the part of
institutional investors would generate substantial error costs.
A straightforward theory predicts that non-passive institutional investors
will be more effective than individual shareholders at monitoring managerial
decision-making and oversight.' 8' The theory posits that individual sharehold-
ers tend to be rationally ignorant of the information needed to engage in ef-
fective monitoring of manager-agents because such information is costly to
obtain, and each individual shareholder's stake in the company and corre-
sponding control right is usually too small to justify the significant resource
expenditures required to get up to speed. 182 Large institutional investors, by
contrast, typically have better access to relevant information (e.g., contacts
with firm insiders), a superior ability to process it effectively (e.g., more busi-
ness expertise, access to shareholder advisory services), and, given their larger
stakes in the corporation, a greater motivation to become adequately in-
formed. They will therefore tend to be more effective, lower-cost monitors of
managerial conduct. 183
Institutional investors with index funds are especially likely to reduce
agency costs. If a company is included in an index that is tracked by a fund
offered by an institutional investor, that investor cannot divest from the
179 Id. at 95.
180 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theog of the Firm: Mana gerial Beha or, Ageng
Costs and Ownership Sructure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
181 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents. The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39
UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Mark J. Roe, A Polical Theo0 of American Coporate Finance, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 10 (1991).
182 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1443 (observing that "[i]nvestors are rationally
uninterested in votes, not only because no investor's vote will change the outcome of the
election but also because the information necessary to cast an informed vote is not readily
available").
183 Posner et al. acknowledge that institutional investors are better positioned to provide the
sort of managerial accountability that reduces agency costs. See Posner et al., supra note 3,
at 674 ("Institutional investors by contrast, could potentially improve on this Berle-Means
model of the corporation featuring widely dispersed ownership by shareholders with ti-
ny stakes by supplying informed and incentivized oversight.").
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company and is thus a long-term investor. Empirical evidence suggests that
institutional investors with long-term investment horizons significantly im-
prove corporate management.
Consider, for example, a recent study by jarrad Harford, Ambrus Kecs-
k6s, and Sattar Mansi. 184 Examining a large panel of firm-years comprising
around 3,000 firms annually over a near 30-year period, the authors studied
how stockholding by long-term institutional investors influenced corporate
decision-making and performance. 85 They used portfolio turnover (i.e., the
percentage of an investor's portfolio that is no longer held at the end of a
three-year period) to capture institutional investors' investment horizons. 186
They then categorized the investors as long-term or short-term,' 8 assessed
the investor horizons of firms according to the ownership percentage of their
long-term investors, 88 and correlated those horizons with firm performance
along a number of dimensions. 8 9 To address concerns that corporate deci-
sion-making and performance could be driving investment by long-term in-
vestors, rather than vice-versa, the authors examined long-term investment in
general and separately assessed the effects of long-term investments by index
funds, which have no discretion over the firms in which they invest. 9 Where
long-term investment as a whole and long-term investment by index funds
184 Jarrad Harford, Ambrus Kecskes, & Sattar Mansi, Do Long-Term Investors Improve Corporate
Decision Making?, 50 J. CoRp. FIN. 424 (2018).
185 Id. at 425.
186 Id. at 428-429.
187 Id. Long-term investors were those with turnover of 35% or less and included investors
that were in approximately the bottom quartile of investor turnover. Id. at 428.
188 Id. at 425 ("We measure investor horizons of firms based on the ownership of their long-
term investors.").
189 Recognizing the monitoring role played by institutional investors generally, the authors
controlled for the total ownership of all institutional investors (both long- and short-
term). Id. at 425-26 ("We also control for the total ownership of institutional investors
because their monitoring role is widely recognized in the literature. Controlling for total
institutional ownership means that long-term institutional ownership captures the effect
of longer institutional investor horizons, which is the effect of interest in our paper.") (ci-
tations omitted). The authors also controlled for blockholder ownership, which may affect
corporate governance. Id. at 426.
190 The authors explained:
Most investors can choose their portfolio firms and managers can attempt to
influence the ownership structure of their firms. Therefore, we design our anal-
ysis to demonstrate that long-term investors have a causal effect on corporate
decision making. To this end, we perform all of our tests using not only long-
term investor ownership as a whole but also its plausibly exogenous part (while
controlling for its possibly endogenous part). Specifically, we establish causality
based on the ownership of long-term investors that index their portfolios ....
Id. at 426.
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were associated with similar outcomes, the authors inferred that long-term
investment must be causing those outcomes and not vice-versa.
Harford et al.'s "overarching conclusion [was] that long-term investors
are an important force of good corporate governance."191 They based that
assessment on the following specific findings:
* Corporate Governance-Ownership by long-term institutional
investors increased board independence and experience, 192 led to
higher levels of executive turnover (which suggests greater disci-
pline of managers), 193 weakened takeover defenses (which have
the effect of entrenching managers), 194 and reduced such mana-
gerial misbehaviors as earnings management, accounting mis-
conduct, financial fraud, and option backdating.195
* Investment and Innovation--Long-term investor ownership
had salutary effects on "innovation efficiency." While ownership
by long-term investors tended to reduce overall corporate in-
vestments, 196 it tended to boost innovation (as measured by pa-
tent counts, citations, originality and generality).197 These results
191 Id. at 448.
192 Id. at 434 ("[L]ong-term investor ownership improves the quality of the board of direc-
tors. Independence increases by 1.63 percentage points, or about 2.4% relative to its
mean. Experience increases by 2.0%.").
193 Id. ("[L]ong-term investor ownership increases the rate of executive turnover by 0.73
[percentage points], or roughly 6% compared to its mean.").
194 Id. (reporting a weakening of takeover defenses for three separate indices of antitakeover
provisions).
195 Id. The authors "measure[d] earnings management using discretionary accruals, account-
ing misconduct using enforcement actions by the SEC, financial fraud using shareholder
lawsuits, and option backdating using suspiciously well timed option grants." Id. They
found that:
long-term investor ownership significantly reduces managerial misbehaviors. In
particular, earnings management decreases by 0.18% of total assets, or about
2
.1% relative to its mean. The rates of accounting misconduct and financial
fraud decrease by 0.27 and 1.34, respectively, or roughly 23% and 27% com-
pared to their means. Finally, the incidence of option backdating decreases by
1.44, or about 10% relative to its mean.
Id.
196 Id. at 436 ("[L]ong-term investor ownership reduces capital, research and development,
and acquisitions expenditures by 0.36%, 0.41%, and 0.23% of total assets, respectively.
Trade credit and inventories decrease by 0.49% and 0.29% of total assets, respectively. In
other words, investment in capital decreases by about 1.8 percentage points in total.").
197 Id. at 437-38. Patent counts and citations are well-known measures of innovation. The
authors explain the other two innovation measures as follows:
Patent originality is the extent to which a given patent cites other patents that
belong to a wide range of technology classes. Intuitively, successor innovations
that are more original are those that use a wider range of predecessor innova-
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suggest that long-term investors discourage wasteful "empire-
building," a classic source of agency costs.
Financing and Payouts-Consistent with reducing overall cor-
porate investments, long-term investor ownership tended to re-
duce corporations' total financing.198 It also tended to decrease
debt maturity,199 causing firms to "become more exposed to fi-
nancial market discipline."200° At the same time, long-term inves-
tor ownership increased both dividends and share repurchases,20'
which "is consistent with managers being more carefully watched
with respect to their use of corporate funds." 02
* Shareholder Value (Returns and Risk)-Returns by portfolios
of companies in the top quintile of long-term investor ownership
were substantially higher than those comprised of companies in
the bottom quintile. Firms with long investor horizons outper-
formed those with short investor horizons by approximately
3.5% per year.2 03 Their "excess returns" (raw returns minus in-
dustry returns) were about 1.5 percentage points per year higher
than those of firms with short investor horizons.20 4 Earnings of
firms with long-term investor horizons were higher by about 0.4
percentage points of total assets, and the volatilities of both earn-
tions. Patent generality is the extent to which a given patent is cited by other pa-
tents that belong to a wide range of technology classes. Intuitively, predecessor
innovations that are more general are those that are used by a wider range of
successor innovations. Patent citations, originality, and generality for a given
firm are measured on an average per patent basis.
Id. The authors found that involvement of long-term investors increased patent counts by
10.6%, patent citations by 3.7%, patent originality by 0.56 percentage points (1.0% com-
pared to its mean), and patent generality by 0.73 percentage points (roughly 1.3% relative
to its mean). Id. at 438.
198 Id. at 441 (reporting that long-term investor ownership reduced balance sheet debt issu-
ance by 0.41% of total assets, off balance sheet debt usage by 0.30% of total assets, and
equity issuance by 0.46% of total assets, so that total financing decreased by about 1.2
percentage points, roughly $22 million for the average firm).
199 Id. (reporting decrease in debt maturity of 1.49 percentage points, or roughly 2.1% relative
to its mean).
200 Id.
201 Id. (reporting that long-term investor ownership increased dividends and share repurchas-
es by 0.28% and 0.39% of total assets, respectively, so that total payouts were higher by
approximately 0.7 percentage points, approximately $13 million for the average firm).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 442.
204 Id. at 443.
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ings and stock returns were lower by approximately 5.2% and
2.5%, respectively.205
There are good reasons to believe, then, that inducing full passivity on the
part of institutional investors would thwart significant welfare gains in the
form of agency cost reductions. As a theoretical matter, institutional investors
could hardly be expected to invest in discovering information about manage-
rial performance if they could not use the information they learned to make
voting decisions, to engage with managers, or to determine whether to sell,
hold, or buy company stock. And it strains credulity to suppose that the laun-
dry list of benefits discovered by Harford et al. could be achieved by long-
term institutional investors that had no ability to influence managerial deci-
sion making by either "voice" (engagement, voting) or the threat of "exit"
(selling shares held by their non-index funds).
The central point here is one that efficiency-minded policy makers must
always keep in mind: A market failure should never be addressed in isolation.
Just as a physician should always consider whether a potential remedy for one
of her patient's ailments would exacerbate another, policy makers should ac-
count for the likely side-effects of any intervention to correct a defect in pri-
vate ordering. If a policy aimed at reducing welfare losses from institutional
investors' common ownership of competing firms drove those investors to
become fully passive at such firms, agency costs would rise. And if, as seems
likely, the welfare losses from common ownership are small and the likely
increase in agency costs from full passivity large, policy makers would do well
to retain the bird- in- the-hand of agency cost-reduction and resist the tempta-
tion to pursue the bird-in-the-bush of competition enhancements that mzght
result from more passive institutional investors.
V. CONCLUSION
The authors of the common ownership studies have helpfully drawn at-
tention to a potential competitive problem that merits further study. The anti-
trust scholars who have proposed policy solutions to that purported problem
have also made a valuable contribution by showing how existing law might be
used to address anticompetitive harms from investors' common ownership of
small stakes in competing firms, should such harms prove grave enough to
warrant additional antitrust intervention (with its attendant downsides). But
let us not get ahead of ourselves. The propriety of additional antitrust inter-
vention depends on whether the expected marginal benefit of enhanced en-
205 Id. at 426, 444-447.
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forcement outweighs the expected marginal cost of the stepped-up interven-
tion. It does not.
The theory as to why current levels of intra-industry diversification would
occasion consumer harm is implausible,2 06 and the empirical evidence of such
harm is both scant and methodologically suspect.2 07 The policy solutions that
have been proposed for dealing with the purported problem would radically
rework an industry that has provided substantial benefits to investors, raising
the costs of portfolio diversification and enhancing agency costs at public
companies. 08 Given these problems with the purported problem and difficul-
ties with the policy solutions to it, proponents of enhanced antitrust interven-
tion have not established that the marginal benefits of their proposals would
exceed the marginal costs thereof 20 9
At this point, then, the optimal regulatory approach is to do nothing
about institutional investors' common ownership of small stakes in compet-
ing firms. Such regulatory modesty may disappoint those with a personal in-
terest in having highly complex antitrust doctrines that are aggressively en-
forced. It is, however, the approach that would maximize social welfare by
minimizing the sum of error and decision cost.
206 See supra Part II.A.
207 See supra Part II.B.
208 See supra Part III.
209 Professor Elhauge contends that scholars raising questions about the evidence of anti-
competitive harm from small stakes common ownership are employing an improper
'Merchants of Doubt' strategy" to avoid or delay regulation. Elhauge, supra note 137, at
23. But it hardly seems improper to demand robust evidence of significant social harm be-
fore upending an entire industry-one that provides substantial social benefit-on the ba-
sis of a questionable theory.
Elhauge also criticizes those who invoke the principle "First, do no harm" in counseling
regulatory caution. Id. at 26. That principle, he says, "cuts in [the] opposite direction be-
cause the evidence ... indicates that, today, we are already suffering harm from horizontal
shareholding" so that "[i]naction is what does harm here, not action." Id. Elhauge appears
to misunderstand the "First, do no harm" principle. It means, "Do no net harm." See Dan-
iel K. Sokol, 'First Do No Harm" Rejisited, BMJ (Oct. 25, 2013),
https://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f6426. The fact that some harm is occurring (if
it truly is) in no way implies that action to correct that harm is appropriate; rather, the ac-
tor must ask whether her efforts to stem the harm might themselves create greater harms.
If so-i.e., if net harm would result from acting-then she should stay her hand in order
to avoid "doing harm." Because enhanced antitrust intervention to prevent anticompeti-
tive harms from institutional investors' horizontal shareholding would likely create greater
social losses by eliminating welfare-enhancing investment products, raising agency costs,
and saddling business planners and adjudicators with tremendous new decision costs, the
"First, do no harm" principle likely calls for a do-nothing regulatory approach here.
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APPENDIX
A NON-TECHNICAL GUIDE TO CALCULATING MHHIA
The Modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (MI-HI) attempts to account
for both market concentration (IHI)210 and common ownership factors
(MI-HIA), which together may influence the competitiveness of markets.
Thus, MLAI = HHI + MHHIA.
The key idea behind MHHIA is that firm managers will tend to maximize
the returns to their firm's shareholders, recognizing that some of those share-
holders are invested in, and will therefore receive payoffs from, the firm's
competitors. The metric assumes that managers are more sensitive to the in-
terests of shareholders with larger stakes in the company and correspondingly
greater voting power.
We attempt below to provide both a narrative description of how
MHHIA is determined and a step-by-step guide to calculating the measure.
To illustrate that process, we calculate MHHIA for a hypothetical market in-
volving four firms and five institutional investors. At the outset, though, we
set forth the technical formula for MI-HIA. Posner et al. express it as fol-
lows211:
MHHIA = 10,000 Si 2
j klj
where:
* /ij is the fraction of shares in firmj controlled by investor i
* the shares are both cash flow and control shares (so control
rights are assumed to be proportionate to the investor's share of
firm profits), and
* sj is the market share of firmj.
210 HHI, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, consists of the sum of the shares of the market
shares of firms participating in a market and ranges from near 0 for "perfect competition"
to 10,000 for pure monopoly.
211 Eric A. Posner, Fiona Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Timit the Anticompetitive
Power of Instutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 683 (2017). This version of the formu-
la assumes proportionate control-i.e., that investors' control rights follow their owner-
ship percentages.
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To unpack this somewhat intimidating formula, we will first describe the
overall process for determining MIHIA and then catalog the specific steps
involved in calculating the measure.
Overview of the Process for Calculating MHHIA
Determining the M-HIA for a market involves three primary tasks. The
first is to assess, for each coupling of competing firms in the market (e.g.,
Southwest Airlines and United Airlines), the degree to which the investors in
one of the competitors would prefer that it not attempt to win business from
the other by lowering prices, etc. 212 This assessment must be completed twice
for each coupling. With the Southwest and United coupling, for example, one
must assess both the degree to which United's investors would prefer that the
company not win business from Southwest and the degree to which South-
west's investors would prefer that the company not win business from Unit-
ed. There will be different answers to those two questions if, for example,
United has a significant shareholder who owns no Southwest stock (and thus
wants United to win business from Southwest), but Southwest does not have
a correspondingly significant shareholder who owns no United stock (and
would thus want Southwest to win business from United). 213
Assessing the incentive of one firm, Firm J (to correspond to the formula
above), to pull its competitive punches against another, Firm K, requires cal-
culating a fraction that compares the interest of the first firm's owners in
coupling profits (the combined profits of J and K) to their interest in own-
firm profits J profits only). The numerator of that fraction is based on data
from the coupling i.e., the firm whose incentive to soften competition one
is assessing J) and the firm with which it is competing (K). The fraction's
212 This assessment involves computation of the fraction on the far right of Posner et al.'s
equation. (That fraction consists of the numerator from step 5 and the denominator from
step 6 of the nine-step guide that follows.)
213 In that case, United's shareholder base (weighted by control) would have a stronger pref-
erence for maximizing own-firm profits (United only) versus coupling profits (United plus
Southwest). Squaring the ownership shares of investors in the firm whose incentive to
compete with the other is under consideration (as is done in the denominator of the frac-
tion on the right of Posner et al.'s equation) gives greater weight to the interests of share-
holders with larger ownership blocks than to similar ownership percentages that are divid-
ed among multiple investors. Thus, the presence of a United-only blockholder with, say,
5% ownership is far more significant in encouraging own-firm profit maximization than is
a 5% stake collectively owned by multiple United-only shareholders. This accounts for the
insight that firm managers tend to be most responsive to their largest shareholders and to
pay less attention to the collective interest of their widely dispersed, uncoordinated share-
holders.
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denominator is based on data for the single firm whose competition-
reduction incentive one is assessing (). Specifically:
* The numerator assesses the degree to which the firms in the
coupling are commonly owned, such that their owners would not
benefit from price-reducing, head-to-head competition and
would instead prefer that the firms compete less vigorously so as
to maximize coupling profits. To determine the numerator, then,
one must examine all the investors who are invested in both
firms; for each, multiply their ownership percentages in the two
firms; and then sum those products for all investors with com-
mon ownership. 214 (If an investor were invested in only one firm
in the coupling, its ownership percentage would be multiplied by
zero and would thus drop out; after all, an investor in only one
of the firms has no interest in maximization of coupling versus
own-firm profits.)
* The denominator assesses the degree to which the investor base
(weighted by control) of the firm whose competition-reduction
incentive is under consideration J) would prefer that it maximize
its own profits, not the profits of the coupling. Determining the
denominator requires summing the squares of the ownership
percentages of investors in that firm. Squaring means that very
small investors essentially drop out and that the denominator
grows substantially with large ownership percentages by particu-
lar investors. Large ownership percentages suggest the presence
of shareholders that are more likely able to influence manage-
ment, whether those shareholders also own shares in the second
company or not.215
Having assessed, for each firm in a coupling, the incentive to soften
competition with the other, one must proceed to the second primary task:
weighing the significance of those firms' incentives not to compete with each
other in light of the coupling's shares of the market. (The idea here is that if
214 These are steps four and five of the nine-step guide that follows.
215 As the numerator grows relative to the denominator, whether because more of Firm J's
investors also own shares of Firm K or because any one investor of J also owns a larger
share of K, the value of the fraction increases, suggesting a stronger incentive to reduce
competition with Firm K. If there are large shareholders of the firm being assessed (J) and
those shareholders also own large shares of the second firm (K), which would increase the
ratio, they are more likely able to induce management to reduce competition. If the large
shareholders in the first firm do not own shares in the second firm (i.e., their contribution
to the numerator is zero), then they are more likely able to influence management to
compete aggressively, even if smaller shareholders do own shares in the second firm.
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two small firms reduced competition with one another, the effect on overall
market competition would be less significant than if two large firms held their
competitive fire.) To determine the significance to the market of the two
coupling members' incentives to reduce competition with each other, one
must multiply each of the two fractions determined above (in Task 1) times
the product of the market shares of the two firms in the coupling. This will
generate two "cross-MIHI deltas," one for each of the two firms in the cou-
pling (e.g., one cross-MHHIA for Southwest/United and another for Unit-
ed/Southwest).
The third and final task is to aggregate the effect of common ownership-
induced competition-softening throughout the market as a whole by summing
the softened competition metrics (i.e., two cross-MIHI deltas for each cou-
pling of competitors within the market). If decimals were used to account for
the firms' market shares (e.g., if a 25% market share was denoted 0.25), the
sum should be multiplied by 10,000.
Following is a detailed list of instructions for assessing the MHMIA for a
market (assuming proportionate control-i.e., that investors' control rights
correspond to their shares of firm profits).
A Nine-Step Guide to Calculating the MHHIA for a Market
1. List the firms participating in the market and the market share of
each.
2. List each investor's ownership percentage of each firm in the
market.216
3. List the potential pairings of firms whose incentives to compete
with each other must be assessed. There will be two such pair-
ings for each coupling of competitors in the market (e.g., South-
west/United and United/Southwest) because one must assess
the incentive of each firm in the coupling to compete with the
other, and that incentive may differ for the two firms (e.g., Unit-
ed may have less incentive to compete with Southwest than
Southwest with United).217 This implies that the number of pos-
216 As a practical matter, investors with tiny ownership percentages-which, for publicly
traded firms, includes the vast majority of investors-will have no discernible effect on
MHHA and can be ignored.
217 See infra note 4 and accompanying text.
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sible pairings will always be n(n-1), where n is the number of
firms in the market.2 18
4. For each investor, perform the following for each pairing of
firms: Multiply the investor's percentage ownership of the two
firms in each pairing (e.g., Institutional Investor l's percentage
ownership in United * Institutional Investor l's percentage own-
ership in Southwest for the United/Southwest pairing).
5. For each pairing, sum the amounts from item four across all in-
vestors that are invested in both firms. (This will be the numera-
tor in the fraction used in Step 7 to determine the pairing's cross-
MHHIA.)
6. For the first firm in each pairing (the one whose incentive to
compete with the other is under consideration), sum the squares
of the ownership percentages of that firm held by each investor.
(This will be the denominator of the fraction used in Step 7 to
determine the pairing's cross-MHMIA.)
7. Determine the cross-MIHIA for each pairing of firms by doing
the following: Multiply the market shares of the two firms, and
then multiply the resulting product times a fraction consisting of
the relevant numerator (from Step 5) divided by the relevant de-
nominator (from Step 6).
8. Add together the cross-MIHIAs for each pairing of firms in the
market.
9. Multiply that amount times 10,000.219
We now illustrate this nine-step process by working through a concrete
example.
218 For example, in a market served by four airlines-American, Delta, Southwest, and Unit-
ed-there would be twelve potential pairings: American/Delta, American/ Southwest,
American/ United, Delta/American, Delta/ Southwest, Delta/United, South-
west/American, Southwest/ Delta, Southwest/ United, United/American, United/Delta,
United/ Southwest.
219 This step is required only if participating firms' market shares (listed in Step 1 and multi-
plied in Step 7) have been expressed using decimals-i.e., a 25 percent market share as .25
and a one percent ownership percentage as .01. Because multiplying market shares ex-
pressed in the hundredths (.25 * .01) will generate a figure in the ten-thousandths (.0025),
this step will be necessary to put the MHHJA measure on a scale similar to HHJ (near ze-
ro to 10,000).
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An Example
Suppose four airlines-American, Delta, Southwest, and United-service
a particular market. American and Delta each have 30% of the market;
Southwest and United each have a market share of 20%.
Five funds are invested in the market, and each holds stock in all four air-
lines. Fund 1 owns 1% of each airline's stock. Fund 2 owns 2% of American
and 1% of each of the others. Fund 3 owns 2% of Delta and 1% of each of
the others. Fund 4 owns 2% of Southwest and 1% of each of the others. And
Fund 4 owns 2% of United and 1% of each of the others. None of the air-
lines has any other significant stockholder.
Step 1: List firms and market shares.
American - 30% market share
Delta - 30% market share
Southwest - 20% market share
United - 20% market share
Step 2: List investors' ownership percentages.
Amen'- South- Unit-
Fund .01 .01 .01 .01
1
Fund .02 .01 .01 .01
2
Fund .01 .02 .01 .01
A
Fund .01 .01 .02 .01
4
Fud .01 .01 .01 .02
-5 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _














12. United- Southwest (US)
Steps 4 and 5: Figure numerator for determining cross-MHHIAs.
I 2 3 4 5 M
AD .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1 2 2 1 1 7
AS .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1 2 1 2 1 7
AU .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1 2 1 1 2 7
DA .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1 2 2 1 1 7
DS .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1 1 2 2 1 7
DU .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1 1 2 1 2 7
SA .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1 2 1 2 1 7
SD .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1 1 2 2 1 7
SU .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1 1 1 2 2 7
UA .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1 2 1 1 2 7
UD .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1 1 2 1 2 7
Us .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
__ _1 1 1 2 2 7
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Step 6: Figure denominator for determining cross-M-HIAs.
Amencan Delta Southwest United
Fund .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
I
Fund .0004 .0001 .0001 .0001
2
Fund .0001 .0004 .0001 .0001
3
Fund .0001 .0001 .0004 .0001
4
Fund .0001 .0001 .0001 .0004
5
SUM .0008 .0008 .0008 .0008
Steps 7 and 8: Determine cross



























Step 9: Multiply by 10,000.
MHHIA = 6475.
(NOTE: HHI in this market would total 30 2 + 30 2 + 202 + 202
2600. M-HI would total 9075.)
AD:
AS:
AU:
DA:
DS:
DU:
SA:
SD:
SU:
UA:
UD:
tUS:
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